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ABSTRACT 
The restructuring process associated with the economic deregulation of the electricity 
supply industry is transforming the electricity market from a vertically integrated industry to 
a horizontally integrated open market system. This new competitive framework affects the 
operational planning of generation companies. Traditionally a cost-minimizing process aimed 
at feasible dispatch of its units, the generation company now needs to develop bidding 
models to maximize its benefits. The objective of this research is to advance strategic bidding 
decision-making to not only consider the technical aspects of unit operation such as capacity 
limits, but also to incorporate information about other market participants and the uncertainty 
of their behaviors. These additional factors are significant especially in an oligopoly market 
because they influence the amount of electricity sold and purchased, hence affecting net 
profit. This thesis presents a decision tree approach to a basic bidding problem and applies 
information gap decision theory to quantify uncertainty. The information gap decision theory 
estimates the uncertainty associated with each bid of the generating unit. With a minimum 
reward level specified using different decision criterion, a feasible range of bids and the 
maximum price bid can be obtained. Data mining technique is proposed next to infer the 
behavior of the competitors and improve the bidding strategy. The results show that one can 
exploit the additional knowledge discovered to outperform other market participants. 
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CHAPTER!. INTRODUCTION 
Since the start of deregulation, many electric utilities and power network companies have 
undergone and are still experiencing dramatic change in the ways they do business. The industry has 
moved from a vertically integrated industry to a horizontally integrated open market system. The 
operational planning activity of a generation company (GENCO) is no longer merely a cost-
minimizing process, but is now a profit maximizing process subject to physical constraints and 
market factors. The objective of this research is to develop strategic bidding decision processes that 
not only consider the technical aspects of unit operation such as capacity limits, but also incorporate 
information about other market participants and the uncertainty of their behaviors. These additional 
factors are significant especially in an oligopoly market because they influence the amount of 
electricity sold and purchased, thus affecting net profit. This thesis proposes a basic bidding problem 
that is solved using decision tree approach and information gap decision theory to quantify 
uncertainty. In addition, a data mining technique is proposed to infer the behavior of the competitors 
to improve the bidding strategy. 
1.1 Deregulation and Power System Restructuring 
Traditionally, the electric power industry was dominated by large utilities that managed activities 
in generation, transmission, and distribution of power. The economic incentives to provide cheaper 
electricity as well as to encourage efficient capacity expansion and investment planning have 
motivated introducing competition in the electricity sector. The advantages of a competitive 
electricity market include the following. 
• Cheaper electricity - competition lowers price and attracts new entrants. 
• Efficient capacity expansion planning - with greater knowledge of demand-supply dynamics, 
investment decisions can be made efficiently for generation companies as they determine the 
appropriate time and location to build new generators. 
• Pricing is cost reflective, rather than a set tariff - price signals encourage the industry 
participants to minimize cost, thus driving down the price. 
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• Cost minimization - this occurs as a result of the pressure on industry participants from 
increased competition. 
• More choices - customers have more choices to buy electricity. 
• Better service - retailers have to provide better service at lower prices due to the increased 
competition. 
• Employment - the increase in the range of players (market traders, economists) in addition to 
classical power engineers will create new jobs. 
To date, almost half of the states in North America are either fully deregulated or in the transition 
stages, while others are in the application process. The restructuring process has introduced increased 
competition and most GENCOs no longer employ the conventional unit commitment and economic 
dispatch techniques to produce optimal price-quantity bids. Instead, GENCOs are now faced with a 
competitive strategic bidding environment at a higher uncertainty level since every market player has 
information about its own production activities and some publicly available information such as 
market clearing electricity prices and fuel prices. 
In this competitive market mechanism, the behavior of each market participant affects but does 
not control the market, hence leading to an oligopoly market where the market is not perfectly 
competitive. Market players are faced with uncertainties in which electricity can now be considered a 
type of commodity and its prices are determined by market forces. Every decision made by the 
market players is dependent on factors that can be described by Porter's five forces. In this 
framework, Porter [37] illustrates the relationship between competitors within an industry, potential 
competitors, suppliers, and buyers. The five forces are barriers to entry, rivalry among existing 
competitors, product substitutes, market power of buyers, and market power of suppliers. 
Optimal bidding strategies can be formulated in several ways depending on what type of 
information is available and accessible. Oftentimes, GENCOs model their bidding strategies with the 
aid of forecasting tools that estimate the market-clearing price (MCP) in the next trading period based 
on historical fluctuations in prices. A more complicated model will try to include the behavior of the 
competitors as well. This research introduces a data mining approach that analyzes the behavior of the 
competitors' policies or strategies in bidding followed by the information gap decision concept to 
quantify uncertainties for the dependent input variables in the bidding model. 
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1.2 Problem Statement and Objectives 
This research proposes the decision tree approach to solve a basic bidding problem in a two-
market participant environment. Information Gap decision theory is then used to quantify the 
uncertainty that arises. Data mining approach using evolutionary technique is applied to a dynamic 
economic model of 4 market participants to infer their behaviors. A formal problem statement for this 
work is: 
"To develop a strategic bidding decision-making system that incorporates the technical aspects of 
unit operation such as capacity limits, information about other market participants and also to 
handle the uncertainty that may arise. " 
The objectives to realize a solution to the problem specified above are as follows. 
1. To develop a fundamental deterministic bidding problem with 2 market participants (2 
GENCOs) competing to sell electricity. 
2. To incorporate uncertainty and an increase in demand in the model. 
3. To develop an information gap model that quantifies risks and uncertainties faced by a 
GENCO. 
4. To build a basic bidding data generation model based on dynamic economic system of 4 
market participants. 
5. To develop a data mining technique that analyzes the behavior of the competitors' decision 
policy or strategy. 
6. To develop the most favorable bidding policy based on the information discovered. 
1.3 Research Contributions 
The dramatic changes in the power industry necessitate a strategic bidding decision making 
system. Previous research, which will be discussed in the following chapter, models competitors' 
bidding strategies as stochastic optimization problems which assume fully specified probability 
distributions. In contrast, the present research attempts to develop a model that does not impose such 
strong assumptions and identifies the shortfalls of such methods by comparing the amounts of losses 
that a GENCO could suffer. In addition, most data mining technique do not attempt to develop the 
most favorable bids. Instead, the models that have been developed so far attempt to forecast and 
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justify the accuracy of the forecasting methods. Therefore, we have implemented a complete forward 
and backward data mining process by creating a virtual economic system of one GENCO trying to 
data mine four other existing GENCOs. 
1.4 Thesis Organization 
This thesis contains 5 main chapters. The first chapter covers a general introduction and overview 
of this research. Chapter 2 discusses previous work with a literature review of methodologies 
implemented for optimal bidding strategies that incorporate data mining techniques. Materials and 
methods used for this research will be laid out in detail in Chapter 3 followed by discussion of the 
results discovered in Chapter 4. The final chapter concludes the research and includes the possibilities 
for extending this research in the near future. 
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CHAPTER2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The power industry has evolved dramatically over the past two decades in an effort to introduce 
fair competition as well as to improve economic efficiency. Traditional monopoly and regulated 
market structure is gradually being restructured to allow power suppliers and sometimes even large 
consumers to openly trade electricity in a competitive environment. In this market mechanism, the 
behavior of each market participant affects but does not control the market, hence leads to an 
oligopoly market structure where the market is not perfectly competitive. Market players are faced 
with uncertainties in an environment within which electricity can be considered a type of commodity 
and its prices are determined by market forces. Thus, each market participant would try to maximize 
profit through strategic bidding. 
2.1 The Governing Porter's Five Forces 
Every decision made by the market players, GENCOs in this case, is dependent on factors that 
can be described by the Porter's five forces (see Fig. 2.1). In this framework, Porter [37] illustrates the 
relationship between competitors within an industry, potential competitors, suppliers, buyers, and 
alternative solutions to the problem addressed. The five forces are barriers to entry, rivalry among 
existing competitors, product substitutes, market power of buyers, and market power of suppliers. 
Supplier 
Power 
Barriers 
to Entry 
Industry Competitors 
Rivalry among generation 
companies 
Threat of 
Substitutes 
Fig. 2.1. Porter's five forces. 
Buyer 
Power 
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In a traditional economic model, competition among rival firms drives profits to zero. However, 
since competition is not perfect and GENCOs tend to be more sophisticated in their roles as passive 
price takers, these firms strive for a competitive advantage over their rivals. There are many ways to 
pursue a competitive advantage over rivals, namely changing prices, improving product 
differentiation, creative use of distribution channels, and exploiting relationships with suppliers. 
Rivalry can be measured by the Concentration Ratio (CR), which indicates the percentage of market 
share held by some of the largest firms. A low CR would imply many rivals in the industry since none 
of the primary firms hold a significant market share. Conversely, if the market is highly concentrated, 
then it is less competitive with a possibility of monopoly occurring in the market itself. Another 
measure of rivalry is the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI). The market for GENCOs follows an 
oligopoly structure and this implies high concentration with less competition among GENCOs. 
However, intensive rivalry does exist among generation companies because of the low level of 
product differentiation, costly exit barrier, high level of fixed costs, high storage cost of fuel, and the 
increasing number of private firms (investor-owned utilities) due to gradual deregulation across the 
nation. 
Substitutes are often associated with products in other industries and become a threat when a 
product's demand is affected by the price change of a substitute product. Depending on the business 
nature of the GENCO, the threat of substitution may arise from products such as gas and other 
sources that are used for heating, such as renewable energy if the GENCO itself does not generate 
electricity from renewable energy. This impacts the industry through price competition. However, 
technology may also play a role in the degree of threats of substitution. For consumers who are 
concerned with the health of the environment, the demand for energy efficiency (geothermal or 
renewable energy) may be inelastic to the price change in electricity generated by gas-fired power 
plants. 
Buyers in the electricity market may be the consumers or the suppliers themselves, and the 
demand from these buyers dictates how purchasing power affects the industry. If the supplier 
discovers that it is more profitable to outsource or to buy from another supplier for its customers, then 
it takes the role of a buyer. The elasticity of demand is fairly low because the supplier itself does not 
respond significantly to consumption (if is it a buyer). Since electricity is needed in most businesses, 
it is difficult to switch to another product, so the demand does not change much when the price 
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changes. However, buyer power threat may gradually increase since there is a growing interest in 
demand side management in the near future. 
Suppliers in the electricity market are mainly companies that supply fuel to GENCOs. 
Sufficiently powerful or influential suppliers can force prices up to increase profits. Suppliers have 
market power in the electricity market because GENCOs incur significant cost when switching to a 
different fuel. Also there exists a credible forward integration threat wherein the fuel suppliers 
themselves may own a few GENCOs to generate electricity for their own use and for the sale to other 
consumers. 
Finally, the possibility that new GENCOs may enter the industry poses a threat to, and may be 
resisted by, other existing GENCOs. There are known by the terms threat of entry and barriers to 
entry. When industry profits increase, we would expect additional GENCOs to enter the market to 
take advantage of the level of available profits, over time driving down the profits for all firms in the 
industry. However, it is not so easy to enter the electricity market because of high investment costs, 
strict environmental obligations, and the high volatilities of the fuel and electricity market. This threat 
may prove to be minimal unless there is effort to increase the competition by governmental 
intervention in terms of providing subsidies to new GENCOs, breaking up large GENCOs into 
smaller ones, or bringing international market suppliers into the industry. 
The interdependence of these forces is viewed as a dynamic or punctuated equilibrium driven by 
innovation and careful analysis to identify the threats and risks that should be considered for decisions 
to be made. Thus, it is important that each GENCO formulate its own strategic bidding model based 
on the analytical studies of these forces to discover the optimal bidding strategy. 
2.2 Fundamental Approaches to Strategic Bidding 
In a perfectly competitive environment with perfect information, the optimal bidding strategy for 
a power supplier is to bid at marginal cost. Strategic bidding simply means that a generator employs a 
different policy that suggests bids other than the marginal cost in an effort to exploit imperfections in 
the market to increase profits. Strategic interactions occur amongst generators because the choice of a 
decision for an agent depends upon what it perceives or expects the decision of other agents to be, 
hence the importance to bid strategically. Given the current competitive electricity market, strategic 
bidding strategies are significant to generation companies in the attempt to win the sale of electricity 
and make money. 
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In pool markets, generation companies and/or customers submit price and quantity bids to the 
market operator (usually, also the ISO). The market operator then performs either a unit commitment 
procedure to obtain optimal dispatch or just a simple order dispatch procedure that maximizes the 
social welfare; highest buy bid is matched with lowest offer bid. The market is then cleared and the 
uniform market-clearing price (MCP) is determined. Bilateral markets require GENCOs to perform 
unit commitment, generation and trading decisions that meet the bilateral contract commitments 
before submitting the dispatch schedule to the ISO. To date, the bidding problem in electricity 
markets are still largely focused on power suppliers. However, demand side bidding is slowly gaining 
in importance. 
The type of information and its accessibility affects the formulation of optimal bidding strategies. 
Oftentimes, GENCOs will model their bidding strategies with the aid of forecasting tools that 
estimate the MCP of the market in the next trading period based on historical fluctuations in prices. A 
more complex model will try to include the behavior of competitors in an attempt to outperform those 
rivals. Specific game theory methodologies may be utilized to generate the optimal price and quantity 
bids. 
2.3 Methodologies for Strategic Bidding 
Determining appropriate bids based on various different methodologies is very important for 
participants in the electricity markets to maximize profits. The various biddable components outlined 
in [l] are energy, capacity and reactive power, and these components have been further disaggregated 
into various categories under the provision of ancillary services. The essential features to be 
considered by a GENCO while formulating its strategy include but are not limited to: 
• technical constraints on unit operation, 
• unit generating costs and the system marginal cost characteristics, 
• bilateral contracts scheduled, 
• market clearing prices (recent and past prices), 
• load and weather forecasts, and 
• auction and bidding protocols. 
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Given these parameters, a bidder in a power pool is thus confronted with both a deterministic and 
a probabilistic problem in formulating its bidding strategy. Most papers approach the bidding strategy 
problem by estimating the market clearing price for the next trading period with expectations 
formulated for the bidding behavior of its rival participants and a game theoretic approach or a 
mathematical formulation. 
fu 1993, A.K. David addressed the strategic bidding problem for competitive power suppliers 
with a conceptual optimal bidding model based on the dynamic programming approach [2]. This 
model includes the consideration of system demand variations, unit commitment costs, profit, 
economic utility maximization and expectations of competitor's behavior to decide on a constant bid 
price for each block of generation. Over the years, optimal profit-maximizing bidding strategy has 
been developed and formulated as an optimization problem by many authors [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. Some 
characterized the competitor's bidding range as probability density function [6, 8]. Rajan and Lamont 
[6] developed a suboptimal bidding strategy where two utilities are competing for a single block of 
energy whereas Cheong et al. [7] addressed a similar problem but incorporated 2°d -order uncertainty 
into the model. Gross and Finlay [3, 7] used an analytical formulation of the problem faced by a 
bidder in the competitive power pool of England and Wales. The analytical formulation was 
developed under the assumption that the market-clearing price is independent of the bid of any 
supplier and hence the MCP can be accurately known before the auction takes place. It focuses on the 
uncertainty in load forecast and actions of competitors that result in an optimal decision to supply at 
generation costs and maximum capacity regardless of generation resources, costs and constraints. 
This method contains elegant theoretical development even though this assumption may not be 
appropriate for the oligopoly structure of the electricity market and provides little insight for 
imperfectly competitive markets. Some authors developed a linear supply function model to 
investigate ways of exercising market power [10] and to formulate the bidding strategies for 
competitive suppliers [9]. 
Many optimization problems are addressed based on marginal cost with perfect competition. 
However, even with perfect competition, the conventional practice of bidding based on marginal costs 
may not result in revenue adequacy for the bidder in a competitive environment. A revenue adequacy 
constraint has been incorporated within the bidder's optimization framework in a study conducted by 
[11]. When imperfect competition is considered in the framework, the competitor's behavior is 
modeled based on its rational expectation of a GENCO's likely bids. Using a game theoretic 
approach, Ferrero and et al. [12] have modeled a coalition of bidders with binding transmission 
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constraints yielding high benefits due to cooperative gaming. On the other hand, Ferrero [13] also 
modeled a non-cooperative game with a game theoretic approach to develop bidding strategies when 
information about other participants is incomplete. These strategies would then consider how others 
in the market behave and how they perceive that this GENCO would behave. 
The electricity market is changing dynamically. New methods or improvements on existing 
methods are important to cater the needs of the market players. Data mining using artificial 
intelligence [14, 15] and regression analysis have been developed to infer the strategies employed by 
the rival participants. Stochastic analyses were included to handle uncertainty that arises from market 
factors. Most of the methodologies developed based on the inclusion of uncertainty have been in 
terms of probability density functions, which can be classified as 1st-order uncertainty. While one can 
provide justification for this kind of knowledge about the underlying uncertainty, relaxing this 
constraint deserves serious consideration. Public and private information based on experts' knowledge 
and forecasted and historical data come in various forms, creating the potential for 2nd-order 
uncertainty, or explicit descriptions of uncertainty about the details of a distribution function on other 
description of uncertainty. The term indicates the existence of uncertainty about the underlying 
uncertainty. This research work proposes a basic bidding model and discusses two types of 2nd-order 
uncertainty that arise, namely (1) the dependency relationship, which was shown to be safely 
ignorable, and (2) when distribution functions are not fully specified, leading to envelopes or 
probability boxes. In addition, an evolutionary data mining approach to infer competitors' actions will 
also be formulated. 
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CHAPTER3. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
This chapter begins with a general description of a fundamental bidding problem that highlights 
the dependency relationship of two GENCOs and the uncertainty that arises. The formulation begins 
with a discrete cost curve model. A decision tree approach is applied to obtain the optimal bidding 
strategy. Later on, a model with imperfect information is introduced to highlight the uncertainty that 
could occur and how this affects the bidding strategy. Discussion of uncertainty is further analyzed 
with Information Gap (Info-Gap) Decision Theory where an Info-Gap model will be introduced to 
handle 2nd -order uncertainty, or uncertainty about uncertainty. 
3.1 Basic Bidding Problem 
This research addresses a bidding problem faced by a generation company (GENCO) in a 
deregulated electric market. Deregulation exposes GENCOs to risks and uncertainties. Electric energy 
sales by a GENCO depend not only on demand and technical constraints but also on the strategies 
followed by its competitors. This creates a need for effective decision-support mechanisms that model 
competitors. In real situations, intelligence about competitors is often uncertain and incomplete, so it 
is important to develop a bidding model that can flexibly handle various kinds of partial information 
about competitors' bids. Partial information includes but is not restricted to the dependency 
relationships among various relevant random variables, such as the bids put forth by a competitor. 
The analysis presented here is based on the following fundamental question: 
"What is the optimal bid to make when information about the competitor's bids is uncertain?" 
The framework for the analysis is a simplified day-ahead auction where the market is cleared one 
day in advance on an hourly basis [16]. Producers, GENCOs in this case, submit hourly bids 
consisting of blocks of energy and their corresponding prices. It is further assumed that this is a 
single-round auction structure where the market participants only submit bids once. The price of a bid 
accepted by the buyer is the price it will pay to the winning GENCO to deliver the corresponding 
block of electric energy. 
The next section begins with a simple example model in which perfect information is available. 
With perfect information, the decision tree approach is applied to the model and yields a 
straightforward solution. This model is then extended to incorporate probability distributions to 
express uncertainty in the competitor's bids. 
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3.2 Decision Tree Approach 
3.2.1. Model 1: Perfect Information 
This model consists of GENCO 1 and a competitor, GENCO 2. Both GENCOs are competing to 
sell X0 megawatt-hours (MWh) of electric energy. GENCO 1 is to determine a bid for an amount and 
a price that will optimize its expected profit. In a competitive environment, GENCO l's decision 
should depend in part on its competitor, GENCO 2. GENCO 1 thus attempts to model GENCO 2 in 
order to bid optimally against GENCO 2. 
The assumptions made in this perfect information model are as follows: 
• GENCO 2 has two generators, A and B. These generators have capacities of X2A and X28 (MWh) 
respectively, and GENCO 2 would need to use both generators to meet the full demand. 
Generator A is assumed to have a fixed operating cost of S2A $/MWh in this basic model 
whereas generator B has a higher cost of S28 $/MWh, as illustrated in Fig. 3.1. 
• Total demand is X0 for the time period in question. 
• GENCO 2 bids at its operating cost. (We may assume that a fixed profit margin is added so that 
GENCO 2 can make a profit, if desired.) S2A is the bid price for the amount of X2A and S28 for 
the remaining energy needed, which is (Xo - X2A). 
• GENCO 1 can meet the demand with one generator, for which the cost of generation is 
represented by S1A· 
($/MWh) 
Sw 
Xv Xw 
(MWh) 
Fig. 3.1. Price per megawatt-hour as a function of MWh. 
(An extension to this model would have the function be strictly positively monotonic.) 
Both GENCOs submit bids to the Independent System Operator (ISO). The ISO determines the 
acceptance rules for submitted bids. Bids are accepted starting from the one with the lowest price per 
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MWh, and proceeding to successively higher priced bids until the total need of Xv has been 
purchased. 
Using a profit-maximizing strategy, GENCO 1, with only one generator, formulates its profit as: 
This function describes the three possible profits for GENCO 1 based on its cost per MWh, S1A· 
The first expression applies when S1A<S2A. In this case, GENCO l's cost is below the cost of its 
competitor GENCO 2's generator A, which is the generator that produces electric energy most 
cheaply. (Therefore, it is also below GENCO 2's generator B.) Thus, GENCO 1 can bid to sell the 
total demand, Xv. GENCO 1 can undercut GENCO 2's lowest bid by bidding below S2A. 
On the other hand, if S2A<S1A<S28, it is best to bid just below S28 for the amount of (Xv-X2A), as 
shown in the 2nd expression of the profit-maximizing function shown earlier. Since GENCO l's cost 
in this case is higher than A, the cheaper of the two generators of GENCO 2, it is impractical to 
undercut that generator by bidding for the total demand because this would incur loss to GENCO 1. 
Instead of attempting to meet the entire demand, therefore, GENCO 1 should bid for the portion of 
the demand that the cheaper generator, generator A, cannot meet at a price that is just low enough to 
undercut generator B. Referring to the 2nd expression, the bid price should therefore be S28- e, where 
e is assumed to be an insignificant amount whose purpose is to barely undercut GENCO 2's bid of 
Sw. 
When S1A is higher than the cost of GENCO 2's generator B, the one that is more expensive to 
run, then GENCO 1 cannot undercut either of GENCO 2' s bids without incurring a loss, so it is better 
off not bidding at all. This yields the last expression in the profit function, 0. 
Based on these facts, how much should GENCO 1 bid? The widely known decision tree approach 
is presented in the following section under solution techniques as a way to determine the optimal bid 
for GENCO 1 to submit. This approach will be expanded later when uncertainty is added to the 
model. Other methods to handle uncertainty such as information gap decision theory will also be 
discussed. 
By adopting the decision tree of Fig. 3.2, GENCO 1 calculates the EMV for each leaf to find the 
most desirable bid, namely the one with the highest EMV. 
With reference to the previously defined profit-maximizing function, there are three branches in 
the decision tree. The first branch denotes GENCO l's bid of S2A-e. In order to perform the EMV 
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calculation, GENCO l needs to know the probability that its bid will undercut GENCO 2's bid. Since 
this model assumes complete information, each branch has a certain outcome so that the probability at 
every leaf is 1. The resulting EMV calculation then for the top branch is simply X0 *(S2A-e-S1A), 
where £ represents the amount that GENCO 1 is willing to give up in order to undercut GENCO 2's 
bid. 
The second branch represents the decision to bid at Sw- e, which would yield a profit rate of Sw-
e -S 1A. Since GENCO 1 needs to undercut GENCO 2's more expensive generator in order to win the 
bid, the amount to bid is X0 -X2A· This yields the EMV expression (Xo-X2A)*(Sw-e -S1A). 
The final branch represents the decision that GENCO 1 does not bid, because its cost exceeds the 
cost of both of the competitor's two generators. 
0 
Fig. 3.2. Decision tree for GENCO 1, given complete information. 
(Mid-range bids make little sense and are not considered.) 
3.2.1.1. Illustrative Example on Perfect Information 
Here is a specific numerical example based on the problem described above. Let the variables be 
represented by the following values: 
Xo=600MWh 
X2A=300MWh 
Xw ~ 300MWh 
S2A = $100/MWh 
Sw = $150/MWh 
S1A = $40/MWh 
£=1 
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Since all the variables have· exact values, in view of the discussion earlier, the only decision to 
make is whether to bid at $99/MWh for Xv= 600 MWh, or $149/MWh for Xv-X2A = 300 MWh. It 
would not make sense to consider any bids lower than $99/MWh for the low bid because GENCO 1 
would just make less profit. Similarly, if GENCO 1 decides to try to undercut S28 but not S2A, then 
GENCO 1 should bid at $149/MWh. A bid of $148/MWh, for example, would make no sense 
because if a bid of $148/MWh would be accepted, a bid of $149/MWh would also be accepted and 
would lead to higher profit. The decision tree is depicted in Fig. 3.3. The resulting three EMV 
calculations indicate that to maximize its profit, GENCO 1 should bid at $99/MWh for a total 
generation of 600MWh. 
$99/MWh <] 600*(99-40) = 35400 
$149/MWh 
300*(149-40) = 32700 
<] 0 
Fig. 3.3. An example of the decision tree with numerical calculations. 
3.2.2. Model 2: Incorporating Uncertainty 
fu the real world, it is often impossible to obtain desired data, let alone the competitor's exact bid 
cost. Most market participants would either use a forecasting tool to estimate the competitor's cost, 
seek expert knowledge, or study the competitor's strategy and market movements based on historical 
data. The goal would be to acquire as much reliable, accurate and useful information as possible to 
include in a decision model. 
Suppose that GENCO 1 does not know the precise operating costs of GENCO 2 generators, but 
has determined distributions for the two generators' costs, F2A and F28• As an example, suppose 
GENCO 1 models those with the following cumulative distribution functions (see Fig. 3.4). 
• F2A: cumulative form of a uniform density function from$( F2A - F2A )/MWh. 
• F28: cumulative form of a normal density function (tail-trimmed) from$( F28 - F28 )/MWh. 
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Fig. 3.4. (a) Cumulative distribution function for F 2 A E (95,105) with a uniform density function. 
(b) Cumulative distribution function for F 2 B E (145,155) with a tail-trimmed normal 
density function. 
Generally, the decision tree maintains a similar structure to that of Figs. 3.2 and 3.3 except that 
the $99/MWh and $149/MWh branches are replaced by sets of branches representing similar, 
plausible bids. The low bids range from $94-$105/MWh and the high bids range from $144-
$155/MWh. For each plausible high bid bh, the probability that the higher of GENCO 2's bids, 
represented by a sample drawn from F28, is greater than bh is of importance for EMV computations. 
Similarly, for each low bid b1, GENCO 1 must use the probability that its competitor GENCO 2's bid 
is greater than b1 in order to calculate an EMV for bid b1• A decision tree that includes this important 
information is shown in Fig. 3.5. 
With the decision tree approach, GENCO 1 uses the cumulative distribution functions F2A and F28 
for EMV calculations. The decision tree selects a set of sample points from the relevant cumulative 
density function. Each point becomes a branch of the decision tree. Nine equally spaced points are 
chosen from each cumulative density function for this analysis, leading to a tree with 18 branches 
(Fig. 3.4). 
The formula used for calculating the EMV of bids b1 in the low range is as follows: 
17 
The nine low range bids' EMV calculations use this formula by replacing b1 with each bidding 
price from $94/MWh to $105/MWh, and multiplying by the probability P(F2A> b1) of winning the bid. 
The decision to bid high is also plausible because S1A < S28 (represented by F2A). Here, GENCO 1 
can sell at most 300 MWh. The formula to calculate EMV for a branch of the tree for a bid bh in the 
high range ($144 to $155) is: 
The eight EMV calculations are computed using the above formula by replacing bh in the EMV 
calculation with different, equally spaced, sample prices in the range of $144/MWh to $155/MWh, 
and using the corresponding probability for P(F28> bh)· 
P(F2A> 105-~) EMV 105-ti 
<J P(F2B>144) EMV144 
P(F2B>155-~) EMV1ss-ti 
Fig. 3.5. Decision tree for GENCO 1 with imperfect information about GENCO 2's bids. A is the 
amount of space between samples. 
Since the cheaper generator of GENCO 2, generator A, has limited capacity, it is evident that 
GENCO 1 is assured the sale of at least 300MWh if it bids in the low range because generator A sells 
at a maximum of 300MWh. But the chance of selling 600 MWh depends on the probability that its 
bid will undercut the cost of the cheaper generator, generator A. For example, if GENCO 1 bids at 
$97 /MWh, it has to consider the probability that the cost of generator A will lead GENCO 2 to bid 
higher than $97 /MWh. 
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Suppose S1A is $40/MWh. The decision tree (Fig. 3.5) implies that the highest EMV will be 
$32400 for a bid of $94/MWh for 600MWh. On the other hand, suppose S1A is $90/MWh. Then the 
decision is to bid at $146.25/MWh for 300MWh with a highest EMV of $16689.38. As a third 
example, suppose S1A is $97/MWh. Then the optimal bid does not change with an EMV of $14612.48 
for a bid at $146.25/MWh for 300MWh. 
3.2.3. Model 3: Increase in Demand 
In the preceding discussion with S JA = $40/MWh, the decision was to bid at $94/MWh for the 
total demand of 600MWh. At first glance it my seem that GENCO 1 might do better by submitting 2 
bids, one attempting to undercut generator A and the other attempting to undercut generator B. 
However, in fact a 1-bid strategy is better, as the following shows. 
3.2.3.1. 1 Bid vs. 2 Bids 
Suppose GENCO 1, attempting to undercut both generators A and B of GENCO 2, submits two 
different bids using, for illustration, the perfect information model described earlier. Since GENCO 2 
also submits two bids, GENCO 1 's bid that was supposed to undercut generator B instead loses to 
generator A. As an example, suppose GENCO 1 submits bids of $99/MWh for 300MWh and 
$149/MWh for another 300MWh. Then its $99 bid will be accepted, while GENCO 2's $100 bid will 
also be accepted, and GENCO 1 thus is chosen to meet only part of the demand. If GENCO 1 had 
made a single bid for the full demand at $99/MWh, it would have won. Thus, GENCO 1 is better off 
submitting one bid. 
However, uncertainty typically arises in the demand for electricity. For instance, extreme hot 
weather may cause the demand for electricity to reach a peak. Thus, GENCO 1 has to perform further 
analysis for the situation where a sharp increase in demand may arise and whether it is still better to 
submit one bid or two bids. 
Referring to the perfect model again, suppose the demand rises to 1000 MWh, and GENCO 1 
once again considers a strategy offering $99/MWh for lOOOMWh, vs. a strategy of losing 300MWh to 
generator 2A while undercutting generator 2B. In this case, the EMV calculated for submitting two 
bids is higher then for submitting one bid at $99 (Table 3.1 ). 
19 
TABLE3.1: 
EMV calculations for 1-bid and 2-bid strategies when demand is lOOOMWh. Only 
400MWh are offered at $149 in the 2-bid scenario because the competitor will 
succeed in selling 300MWh at $100, so the total demand of lOOOMWh will be met. 
Bid Bid 
Strate av {$/MWhl fMWh) EMV 
1..bid 99 1000 59000 
Total 59000 
2--bid 99 300 17700 
149 400 43600 
Total 61300 
However, even in this case GENCO 1 can do better by submitting only one bid that undercuts 
generator 28, instead of trying to undercut generator 2A, as illustrated in Table 3.2. 
TABLE3.2: 
EMV calculations for two different 1-bid strategies when demand is lOOOMWh. Only 
700MWh are offered at $149 because the competitor will succeed in selling 300MWh 
at $100, so the total demand of lOOOMWh will be met. 
Bid Bid 
Strategy ($/MWh) (MWh} EMV 
1-0id 99 1000 59000 
1-0id 149 700 76300 
Thus, here again it is clear that GENCO 1 is better off submitting one bid than two. Often, we do 
not have an exact representation for the distribution of the cost curves. We may only have information 
on the bounds of the distributions and hence that leads us to the next section where we present 
concepts to handle this type of uncertainty. 
3.3 Information Gap Decision Theory 
Typical methods to estimate the bidding behaviors of rival participants are developed based on 
probabilistic analyses [17, 18]. However, probabilistic techniques do not directly handle fuzzy or 
heuristic information. Research on that has involved techniques such as fuzzy set based methods [19], 
possibility theory [20], and intelligent trading agents, such as genetic algorithms, genetic 
programming, and finite state automata that are utilized for developing adaptive and evolutionary 
bidding strategies [ 14, 15]. 
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This section proposes information gap (info-gap) decision theory (IGDT) [21] to develop bidding 
strategies for generation companies. IGDT is useful when decisions must be made under severe 
uncertainty. A non-probabilistic quantifier of uncertainty that makes no underlying assumptions about 
the structure of the uncertainty is used. An info-gap model concentrates on what is known and what 
could be known. Given very sparse information, a "robustness" function is introduced to describe 
immunity to failure. This function helps to facilitate the study of various trade-offs inherent in the 
decision. 
The analysis presented here is based on [8] and addresses the following question: How is a 
company to bid when information about the competitor's bids is highly uncertain? The framework for 
the analysis is a simplified day-ahead auction where the market is cleared one day in advance on an 
hourly basis [36]. Producers, GENCOs in this case, submit hourly bids consisting of blocks of energy 
and their corresponding prices. It is further assumed that this is a single-round auction structure where 
the market participants only submit the bids once. The price of a bid accepted by the buyer is the 
price it will pay to the winning GENCO to deliver the corresponding block of electric energy, which 
is also known as discriminatory pricing. 
The following section begins with the problem formulation and explains how the Expected 
Monetary Value (EMV) for each bid is bounded. An info-gap model is then developed based on the 
resulting EMV bounds. Acquisition of additional information can be expensive and depends on the 
demand value of information. A comparison on how much gain we can get from the extra information 
will be discussed to justify the worth of acquiring possibly costly information. Finally, we summarize 
the results discovered as well as directions for future work. 
3.3.1 Information Gap: Problem Formulation 
This problem is formulated with two generation companies, GENCO l and a competitor, 
GENCO 2. Both GENCOs are competing to sell Xv megawatt-hours (MWh) of electric energy. 
GENCO l is to determine a bid for an amount and a price that will serve its profit-making interests. 
In a competitive environment, GENCO l's decision should depend in part on its competitor, GENCO 
2. GENCO l thus attempts to model GENCO 2. 
In general, the basic elements of contract bidding include direct labor costs, mark up or return, 
overhead, and profit. If GENCO 1 intends to undercut GENCO 2 and wins the sale, then GENCO 2' s 
generation cost has to be included in the model. Various traditional methods can be used to build this 
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model. One such method is to use random variables with applicable distributions to represent the 
unknowns. While these approaches may be able to produce results, the dependability of these results 
on the underlying assumptions about the details of the distributions can make them problematic. To 
force assumptions in order to make the problem tractable is undesirable. 
Given lack of knowledge about the generation costs and the relationships among these variables, 
a natural approach is uncertainty quantification. Instead of using specific distribution functions to 
model the cost functions, F2A and F28, we employ probability boxes to model the incompleteness of 
the available information. In other words, the uncertainty is described by distribution functions 
together with error bounds, as shown in Figs. 3.6-3.7. 
Given the 2nct_order uncertainty for GENCO 2's cost functions, GENCO 1 has the options to 
submit one bid or two bids. By submitting one bid, GENCO 1 decides whether to attempt to underbid 
G2A or G28. Two-bid submission involves trying to underbid both generators. These 3 scenarios are 
simulated and analyzed to determine the optimal one given a total demand of X0 =1000MWh with 
F1A=$40/MWh. The generation capacity for each generator is as follows: 
X1A 2 lOOOMWh 
X2A=300MWh 
Xw 2 700MWh 
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Fig. 3.7. GENCO 2 cost function, FZB for G2B. 
3.3.1.1 Scenario 1: Attempt to Underbid G2A 
In this scenario, GENCO 1 formulates its bid, BJ. by ignoring the existence of G28• With only one 
goal in mind, that is to outbid G2A, two different decisions are made with respect to the cost of G2A, 
which is represented by F 2A· If F2A > B1, GENCO 1 can sell all lOOOMWh of electricity because G2A 
has higher cost. On the other hand, if F2A <BJ, then GENCO 1 definitely loses to G2A and thus, can at 
best sell 700MWh of electricity. Since F2A is described by a probability box with error bounds (Fig. 
3.6), the EMV calculated will be bounded by an interval. An example of how the EMV values are 
calculated is shown in Fig. 3.8. 
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Fig. 3.8. GENCO 2 cost function, F2A for G2.4. 
Assuming that bid B1=$97/MWh, the cumulative probability range for F2A definitely less than B1 
is [O, 0.1], with a width and therefore in this case a probability of 0.1. The cumulative probability 
range for F2A definitely greater than B1 is [0.3, 1.0], with a width and therefore a probability of 0.7. 
The cumulative probability range over which it is not known whether F2A is less than or greater than 
B1 is [0.1, 0.3], which has width and therefore probability 0.2. The following calculations may be 
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performed, where the low bound of the EMV is denoted by EMV(low) and the high bound is 
represented by EMV(high). 
Case 1: F2A < B1 (definitely) 
Profit= 700*(97-40)*(0.l-O) = 3990 
Case 2: F2A > B1 {definitely) 
Profit= 1000*(97-40)*(1.0-0.3) = 39900 
Case 3: Uncertain region 
The EMVofthis case can vary from a case I-like minimum of700*(97-40)*(0.3-0.l) = 7980 to a 
case 2-like maximum of 1000*(97-40)*(0.3-0.l) = 11400. 
Since either case 1, 2, or 3 will tum out to apply, the EMV of a bid of $97 /MWh is the sum of the 
three EMVs of the three cases, or 3990+39900+[7980, 11400]=[51870, 55290). 
Doing the same computations on other bid prices, it turns out that the bid with the highest 
potential EMVoccurs at $96.25/MWh with a maximum EMVof 55714 and the bid with the highest 
guaranteed minimum is $94/MWh with a minimum EMVof 54000, as shown in Fig. 3.9. The upward 
trend toward the right-hand side of Fig. 3.9 would be the left-hand side of an analogous figure 
illustrating scenario 2, described next. 
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Fig. 3.9. Plot of EMV bounds (in thousands) against bid prices (in $/MWh). 
3.3.1.2 Scenario 2: Attempt to Underbid G28 
In this scenario GENCO 1 attempts only to underbid GENCO 2' s more expensive generator, 
perhaps thinking that the resultant high rate of return per MWh if that 700 MWh bid is accepted will 
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more than make up for the 300 MWh block that will not be sold because GENCO 2's less expensive 
generator Gv. wins that block. 
The EMV calculations are performed similarly to the previous scenario except that the cost 
function for G28 is used in this case instead of the cost function for Gv.. It turns out that the highest 
EMV that may be obtained with certainty under this scenario is at a bid of $143/MWh, for a minimum 
EMV of 72100. However, a bid of $143.90/MWh leaves open the possibility that we may enjoy an 
even higher EMV than that because then the EMV is within the interval [71664.42, 72195.25] (Fig. 
3.10). 
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Fig. 3.10 Plot of EMV(low) and EMV(high) based on the cost function of G2B. 
3.3.1.3 Scenario 3: Attempt to Underbid both G2A and G28 
Here, GENCO 1 submits 2 different bids (B1 and B2) based on an attempt to underbid the two 
generators of GENCO 2. If it is definite that B1 > F2A, GENCO 1 does not sell the 300 MWh block 
because it did not underbid GzA· When on the other hand it is definite that B1 < F2A, GENCO 1 sells 
the 300 MWh block. When it is not definite whether B1 > F2A or B1 < F2A, the EMV cannot be exactly 
known because the distribution of Fig. 3.6 is not exactly known. As for the attempt to underbid 
GENCO 2's higher cost generator G28, when it is definite that B2 > F28 , once again GENCO 1 loses 
(and hence need not even bother to bid). However, when it is definite that B2 < F28, GENCO 1 can 
sell 400MWh of electricity at a price of B2 because it sells 300MWh at price B1 and loses another 
300MWh to G2A. Working through the computations gives a maximum certain EMV of 57400, 
obtained by submitting a bid of $94/MWh for 300MWh and a bid of $143/MWh for 400MWh. 
However, higher bids can result in interval-valued bounds on EMVs for which the high bound is 
higher than 57400 although the low bound would be lower than that. 
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3.3.1.4 Summary Based on the 3 Scenarios 
The results clearly show that the best scenario of the three is the second, in which GENCO 1 
attempts to underbid only G28. Thus, this scenario should be used to guide the bid. However this still 
leaves open the question of exactly what to bid given the uncertainty present. Perhaps additional 
information will reduce uncertainty and allow us to better determine a value to bid. The next section 
introduces the info-gap model to quantify the uncertainty described by the envelopes bounding the 
cost function of G28 (Fig. 3.7) in order to assist GENCO 1 in determining the best bid value. 
3.3.2 Model 4: The Info-Gap Model 
Information Gap Theory [21] is useful for making decisions in cases where uncertainty is present 
and severe. For example, distributions may be not fully specified, as in Figs. 3.6-3.7. 
Suppose that we wish to ensure that the EMV of a bid (corresponding to the expected profit) 
meets or exceeds a given minimum value. An information gap model helps to identify bids meeting 
that requirement. More interestingly, the model also identifies the uncertainty-reducing information 
that would need to be obtained to ensure that other, possibly more desirable bids, meet that 
requirement. An example of such a potentially more desirable bid would be one that corresponds to a 
wide range of possible EMV values, some quite high and desirable, and others below a minimum 
tolerable EMV. For example, in Figs. 3.10-3.11, the bidder may enjoy a high EMV of 74200, at a bid 
of $145/MWh, but that bid may also result in an EMV of 29680 if the true curve happens to be the 
lowest EMV curve shown. This staggering range can be reduced with more information that reduces 
the amount of uncertainty in the model. A comparison between the cost of obtaining such information 
and its benefits should be performed to decide on whether to obtain the information or not. 
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Fig. 3.11. A wide range of possible EMV values for a given bid. 
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An information gap model for this example problem may be specified as follows. 
l. Decision variable. This is our bid B2 in $/MWh. 
2. Uncertain variable. Define a cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the competitor's bid 
that serves in the role of nominal best guess. Any CDF judged to fill this role could be used. 
For purposes of illustration we use "horizontal averaging" of the left and right CDF 
envelopes of Fig. 3.7, giving the intermediate curve of Fig. 3.12. In horizontal averaging, for 
each vertical axis value y;, the corresponding horizontal axis values of the left envelope, Bz, 
and of the right envelope, B,, are averaged, giving a value B;=(B1+B,)12. The point (B;, y;) is 
on the average CDF curve, which may be plotted as precisely as desired by using an 
appropriate set of values for i. The average CDF serves as a nominal best guess CDF. Our 
current work suggests that considering other averaging methods as well, but the structure of 
the following discussion is independent of what averaging method is used. Horizontal 
averaging as just defined weights the left and right envelopes equally. However the weights 
of the envelopes could potentially be anything between 0 and 1 (the weights must add up to 
1). These weights affect the averaging computation. Accounting for weights generalizes the 
averaging formula to Bi=(wB1+(1-w)B,)/2. 
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Fig. 3.12. Best-guess curve between the left and right envelopes computed by horizontal 
averaging, and the maximum uncertainty a, showing that the space of plausible curves is within 
the envelopes. 
Let the uncertain variable in the info-gap model be the weight w of the left envelope, with the 
weight of the right envelope then being 1-w. Then Fig. 3.13 describes the EMV values 
calculated from the CDF envelopes of Figs. 3.7 & 3.12. 
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Fig. 3.13. EMV curves corresponding to the left envelope of Figs. 3.7 & 3.12 (lowest curve), the 
right envelope (highest curve), and the horizontal average of the left and right envelopes. 
3. Nominal value of uncertain variable. There seems to be no particular reason to prefer 
weighting one envelope more than the other when doing horizontal averaging, so the default 
nominal value of weight w is w =0.5. 
4. Uncertainty parameter. The amount of uncertainty in the model, a, is the amount of 
deviation from the nominal value of the uncertain variable that is to be considered. In this 
model, that is the amount of deviation from w =0.5. In the worst case, this might be ±0.5, 
giving a range of weights from 0 to 1. Further information might shrink the uncertainty 
parameter to a subset of ±0.5, and it might be necessary to obtain such information to ensure 
goals are met. Determining this is the goal of the information gap analysis. 
5. Uncertainty model. This is the function U(a, w) that describes the amount of uncertainty in 
the uncertain variable w in terms of its nominal value w and uncertainty parameter a. 
Consistent with points 2-4 above, we have U (a, w )= { w: w :::; I w + a I } . 
6. Reward function. The reward is· the EMV of a bid. It is determined by the bid value and the 
EMV curve that applies. In this problem, the EMV curve is uncertain, so the worst possible 
EMV curve is used, to allow the reward function to provide the minimum EMV that the bid 
could be associated with, as required by the info-gap analysis. The worst possible EMV curve 
is in turn determined by the leftmost possible CDF curve for the competitor's bid. This curve 
is found by horizontal averaging with an averaging weight of w +a. Using this curve is 
consistent with the ultimate goal of designing the bid and any necessary information-seeking 
activities to ensure at least a minimum EMV. Thus reward function R is defined by: 
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Where F
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(B
2
) is the highest possible envelope around the function Fzs (i.e. the left envelope 
in Fig. 2), and Fw(B
2
) is the corresponding lowest possible envelope (i.e. the right envelope). 
7. Critical reward. This is the minimum acceptable value of the reward function, call it re. The 
results of an information gap analysis differ depending on the value assigned to r 0 as we will 
see. This minimum acceptable value is an input to the model. 
8. Robustness function. This function, a(b, ~), returns the greatest value of uncertainty 
parameter a for which falling below the critical reward re is not possible in the model. It 
therefore measures the ability of the model to deliver acceptable reward in the presence of 
uncertainty, hence the term robustness. Its value is therefore dependent on acceptable reward 
re. It is also dependent on the bid B2, because the reward is dependent on B2. 
Fig. 3.14 gives information about a(b,rJ for a range of bid values, and a specific value of re, 
which would be a business decision provided as a model input. For bid values toward the left of Fig. 
3.14 (denoted as region 'X'), the EMV is above re regardless of which EMV curve is considered, so re 
will be safely met for any of those bids. 
However it may be desired to consider bidding higher in order to reap the potential opportunity 
for greater gain due to potentially higher EMV values such as, for example, the peak feasible EMV of 
$146.25/MWh for region 'Y'. This is simply an analytical elaboration of the intuition that the higher 
the bid, the greater the profit if the bid is successful, but the higher the chance that a competitor will 
undercut the bid resulting in no profit. Thus, bids in the range designated by 'Y' in Fig. 3.14 are not 
·guaranteed to have an EMV of at least re unless new information is obtained that rules out values of w 
that are too close to 0 (thereby moving the worst-case EMV curve upward). Note that from Fig. 3.14, 
a bid of $146.25/MWh, which would possibly result in an EMVas high as 74315.5, is infeasible if we 
want to be sure to get a reward at least as high as critical reward re. 
Finally, bids so high that even the top EMV curve falls below re (somewhere to the right of the 
domain shown in Fig. 3.14) are infeasible in that they will definitely result in an EMVbelow re. 
To summarize, the result of an information gap analysis is a validation (or invalidation) of a bid 
value based on whether its EMV meets minimal requirements. However, the analysis does not tell us 
what the best bid is. This will be discussed in the next chapter on various decision criteria used to 
determine the bid. 
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Fig. 3.14. Critical reward separates the EMV curves into regions. 
3.4 Data Mining Approach using Genetic Programming 
Data mining refers to the process of transforming collected raw data into usable information. 
Although data in its raw form is of limited use, it can be manipulated to realize its potential use. Raw 
data can be aggregated and analyzed, together with heuristic knowledge about the nature of the 
problem, providing significant information that can be acted upon in making informed decisions. 
This section explains the data mining process with a deterministic model. This section 
provides an overview of genetic programming and the algorithms used for data mining purpose. A 
simple data mining example will be provided at the end of this section. 
3.4.1 Introduction to Genetic Programming 
A class of machine learning algorithms, genetic programming is a branch of genetic algorithms. 
Based on the principles of natural evolution, genetic algorithms were developed earlier by Holland in 
1975 (22] and Goldberg in 1989 (23] and involve a set of search, adaptation, and optimization 
techniques. The primary difference between genetic programming and genetic algorithms is the 
representation of the solution. In genetic algorithms, the genetic structures are represented as 
character strings of fixed length and the solution yields a string of numbers. Although this may be 
adequate for many applications, the form and size limitations motivate the extension of genetic 
algorithms to genetic programming, which was developed by Koza (1992) (24]. Especially for 
financial applications that utilize decision tree representations, genetic programming provides the 
ability to represent different trading or decision rules in a natural way. The following section will 
provide an overview of genetic programming. 
30 
3.4.2 Setting up the Genetic Programming Problem 
Similar to biological genetic process, genetic programming iteratively transforms a population of . 
programs into new generation of programs by applying natural genetic operations such as crossover, 
mutation, reproduction, gene duplication, and gene deletion. Before genetic programming is 
implemented, we need to identify the set of terminals such as the independent variables of the 
problem, zero-argument functions, and random functions for each branch of the to-be-evolved 
program. In addition, the set of primitive functions and the fitness measure have to be determined. 
Certain parameters to control the run and a criterion for termination have to be specified. Finally, the 
designation of the result is determined. All these preparatory steps are summarized in the following 
figure. 
Tenuimd Set 
Fitness 
Measure 
GP 
Parameters 
A Computer Program 
Source: http://www.genetic-programming.org 
Tennination Criterion 
and Result Designatiim 
Fig. 3.15. Genetic programming preparatory steps. 
A brief description of each function shown in Fig. 3.15 is next. 
1. Terminal set: The user defines a set of independent variables and numerical constants with 
respect to the problem. For example, in an attempt to simulate financial trading rules over a 
portfolio of stocks, the minimum or maximum prices can be included as the terminal set. 
2. Function set: The user defines the functions, which may consist of arithmetic functions such as 
addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division and/or other conditional branching operators. 
3. Fitness measure: The user specifies what needs to be completed. For example, the fitness 
measure may be the expected profits over the real profits on the entire portfolio. 
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4. Control parameters: The user determines the population size that produces a reasonably large 
number of generations to cover many possibilities. For example, the user may specify conditions 
that ignore certain irrelevant generations that produce negative profits for the portfolio. 
5. Termination criterion and result designation: The user states a criterion for the program to 
terminate which may be for example in terms of generation size, total runtime or a reasonable 
threshold value of expected profits over real profits. 
3.4.3 Implementation of the Genetic Programming Algorithm 
After specifying the initial conditions and control parameters, a genetic programming algorithm is 
ready to be implemented. The implementation steps for genetic programming are as follows: 
1. An initial population is randomly generated. 
2. Iterate until the termination criterion is satisfied: 
a. For each individual in the population, evaluate its fitness using the fitness measure 
determined earlier. 
b. Genetic operations are performed on "selected" individuals in the population to 
create new generations. 
1. Reproduction: copy the selected individual to new population. 
IL Crossover: create new offspring for the new population by recombining 
randomly chosen parts of two individuals. 
111. Mutation: create new offspring for the new population by randomly 
mutating a chosen individual. 
3. After the termination criterion is satisfied, the best-so-far individual is harvested and 
designated as the result of the run. If the run is successful, the result is a candidate solution 
(or approximate solution) to the problem. 
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3.4.4 Using Genetic Programming to Construct Decision Tree 
Genetic algorithm has been extensively used in a number of research areas. In general, it is 
commonly used for classification purpose where it attempts to generate the most efficient tree for 
decisions. For example, a genetic algorithm might be used to determine whether it is a good day to 
play tennis based on the weather outlook, humidity, and day of the week. Since financial decisions are 
also based on decision trees, there has been a growing interest in using genetic algorithms for 
financial economics. Li and Tsang [25] developed a slightly modified genetic programming known as 
the Financial Genetic Programming (FGP) to predict whether a price series will increase by r% or 
more within the next n periods with specific rules. Instead of specifying the rule set in advance for the 
decision tree, Allen and Karjalainen [26] produce a different exhaustive genetic program to develop 
the rule set for trading purposes. The following sections will discuss the different decision trees 
constructed for classification, building a decision tree with a specific rule set, and seeking the optimal 
rules by constructing trees from genetic programming. 
3.4.5 Genetic Algorithms for Classification 
One of the earliest machine-learning algorithms was developed by Holte [27]. This lR or 1-Rule 
algorithm generates a one-level decision tree that only tests one particular attribute. The pseudo-code 
for this algorithm is as follows: 
For each attribute, 
For each value of that attribute, make a rule as follows: 
Count how often each class appears 
Find the most frequent class 
Make the rule assign that class to this attribute-value. 
Calculate the error rate of the rules. 
Choose the rules with the smallest error rate. 
Since it is unable to handle more attributes needed for complex problem, an improved genetic 
algorithm known as the ID3 was developed. It is a process of top-down induction of decision trees 
that uses the divide-and-conquer method. To select the best splitting attribute, it uses the highest 
information gain based on an entropy formula to generate a decision tree. Refer to Appendix B for 
more information on entropy formula and information gain calculation. 
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The general steps for ID3 are as follows: 
• First: attribute is selected for root node using infonnation gain and branch is created for each 
possible attribute. 
• Then: the instances are split into subsets (one for each branch extending from the node). 
• Finally: procedure is repeated recursively for each branch, using only instances that reach the 
branch. 
• Stop: when all instances have the same class. 
An improvement over ID3, C4.5 was developed by Quinlan [28, 29] to generate pruned decision 
trees. It infers decision tree from the training set to convert the learned tree into an equivalent set of 
rules. This algorithm prunes each rule by removing any precondition that results in improving the 
estimated accuracy. It uses infonnation gain ratio (refer to Appendix B) as opposed to the 
infonnation gain used in ID3. C4.5 is able to handle missing data and continuous data and also allows 
classification of decision tree via rules specified in advance. In short, C4.5 addresses the following 
issues: avoidance of over-fitting the data, reduced error pruning, rule post-pruning, handling of 
continuous attributes, choosing an appropriate attribute selection measure, handling training data with 
missing attribute values, handling attributes with differing costs, and improving computational 
efficiency. Refer to Appendix Con descriptions and pseudocodes for ID3 and C4.5. 
3.4.6 Financial Genetic Programming (FGP) 
The introduction of genetic programming by Koza (24, 30, 31] has drawn interest from the 
financial perspective in terms of using the decision tree representation to handle rule sets of variable 
size that are easily comprehensible by human users. Li and Tsang [25) developed a tool called 
Financial Genetic Programming to predict price series and compared it with the widely used C4.5 
algorithm with respect to accuracy of prediction and the average annualized rate of return. 
According to the authors, a candidate solution is represented by a genetic decision tree (GDT). 
The basic elements of GDTs are rules and forecast values, which correspond to the functions and 
terminals in genetic programming explained earlier. Each GDT is evaluated based on a fitness value 
that reflects the quality of the GDT for solving the problem at hand. FGP maintains a set of GDTs 
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called a population and works iteratively. For each iteration, FGP creates a new population generation 
using standard genetic crossover, mutation, and reproduction operators. 
Given two GDTs (called parents), the crossover operator in FGP works as follows (usually used 
with high probability - 0.9): 
• Randomly select a node within each parent GDT as a crossover point. 
• Exchange the subtrees rooted at the selected nodes to generate two children. 
Mutation works as follows to keep a population with sufficient diversification (usually used with 
low probability - 0.1): 
• Randomly select a node within a parent tree as the mutation point. 
• Generate a new tree with limited depth. 
• Replace the subtree rooted at the selected node with the generated tree. 
Reproduction is used to evolve new generations with low probability as well (e.g. 0.1). There are 
two different selection strategies, the roulette wheel strategy and the tournament strategy. Tournament 
is preferred based on the justifications presented by Miller & Goldberg (1995). 
As an extension to this FGP paper, Li and Tsang also conducted a case study on investment that 
compares the FGP algorithm with the commonly used machine-learning algorithm C4.5 [32]. The 
goal was to recognize investment opportunities where a return of r = 2.2% or more can be achieved in 
n = 21 trading days and to test the effectiveness of FGP when rand n take on different values. In this 
paper, the authors provide a simple GDT for decision-making. The following is the rule used to 
determine the decision to invest or not to invest. 
IF (PMV_50 < -18.45) 
THEN Positive 
ELSE 
Today's price: 
IF ((TRB_5 > -19.48) AND (Filter _63 < 36.24)) 
THEN Negative 
ELSE Positive 
PMV _50: the average price of the previous 50 trading days 
Filter _5: the minimum price of the previous 5 trading days 
Filter _63: the minimum price of the previous 63 trading days 
TRB_5: the maximum price of the previous 5 trading days 
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This rule simply means if today's price is 18.45 or more below the average price of the last 50 
days, then the goal can be achieved if we invest today (we call today a positive position). Otherwise, 
if today's price is no more than 19.48 above the maximum price of the previous 5 trading days and 
today's price is less than 36.24 above the minimum price in the last 63 days, then it is negative and 
the decision is not to invest. 
The fitness value used in their paper is: 
P: number of positives 
N: number or negatives 
Rate of Correctness (RC) where RC = (P + N)fl' 
T: total number of predictions 
FGP is a rule set based approach to genetic programming in the sense that it specifies the 
conditions and resultant actions for making the decisions. fu the two papers mentioned previously, 
FGP worked with historical data and divided them into training and test sets for performance 
comparison. According to the authors, they discovered that FGP performs better than C4.5 but that 
this may be due to over-fitting of data. From those iwo papers, FGP determines the solutions directly 
based on the rules whereas in conventional decision tree analysis, we present all the different 
possibilities and obtain the highest Expected Monetary Value (EMV). However, since this is a type of 
programming, more rules can be added and EMV values can be stored to help find the maximum 
value. To make this happen, we need a decision tree that is able to forecast future values based on the 
historical data and other factors. fu the papers, the authors discuss this but do not provide any 
significant information on how this can be achieved. FGP is similar to C4.5 (rule set) in that both use 
standard genetic operators such as crossover, mutation and reproduction. The main differences are the 
selection strategy and the fitness rule. 
As a continuation to FGP, Markose, Tsang et al. [33] developed and implemented FGP-2 (the 
authors called the earlier work FGP-1). The authors attempt to identify the slightest arbitrage 
opportunities to make profits in a short time period of 10 minutes. fu addition to the fitness rule, FGP-
2 also includes a constraint that trains the FGP to specify minimum and maximum number of 
profitable arbitrage opportunities. 
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3.4.7 Using Genetic Programming to Determine Trading Rules 
FGP specifies rules before building GDT. Authors such as Allen & Karjalainen (26] and Berker 
and Seshadri [34] use genetic programming to find technical trading rules. In the previous section, the 
authors tested whether specific rules work. These papers seek to find out whether a certain sense of 
optimal rules can be used to forecast future returns. The method used searches for both the structure 
and the parameters of the rules simultaneously. 
Allen & Karjalainen find technical trading rules for a composite stock index that specify the 
position to be taken the following day, given the current position and the trading rule signal. The 
building blocks for the trading rules include functions of past price data, numerical and logical 
constants. The terminal and function sets include real and Boolean values: average price, arithmetic 
operators(+,-,*,/), AND, OR, NOT and comparators(<,>). The fitness measure used is based on 
the excess return over the buy-and-hold strategy. 
The GP was used on 2 different types of data: training data and selection period, to validate the 
inferred trading rules from the training data. The general idea is summarized as the following steps: 
1. Create random rule. Compute the fitness of the rule as the excess return in the training period 
above the buy-and-hold strategy. Repeat 500 times to generate the initial population. 
2. Apply the fittest rule in the population to the selection period and compute the excess return. 
Save this rule as the initial best rule. 
3. Pick two parent rules at random, using a probability distribution skewed towards the best 
rule. Create a new rule by the genetic crossover operator and compute the fitness again. 
Replace one of the old rules by the new rule. Repeat 500 times to create one generation. 
4. Apply the fittest rule in the population to the selection period and compute the excess return. 
Save it as the best new rule if the excess return is higher than previous best rule. 
5. Terminate the GP algorithm if there is no improvement for 25 generations or after a total of 
50 generations. Otherwise, go to step 3. 
< 
Average Price 
50 
This corresponds to a 50-day moving average 
rule which returns a "buy" signal if the 50-
day moving average of past closing prices is 
less than the closing price today, and "sell" 
otherwise. 
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> 
Price Maximum 
30 
This corresponds to a 30-day moving average 
rule which returns a "buy" signal if the price 
is greater than. the maximum of the past 30 
days' prices, and "sell" otherwise. 
Fig. 3.16. An illustrative example of a trading rule. 
The results presented in their paper provide a systematic relation between trading rule signals and 
volatility because investors' reactions change as the expected volatility changes. When volatility is 
lower (higher) than expected, expected returns decrease (increase), and the corresponding upward 
(downward) revision of prices is picked up by the trading rules. Allen & Karjalainen implement the 
GP using C code. They conclude that the rules do not earn consistent excess returns over the buy-and-
hold strategy in the out-of-sample test periods. 
Becker and Seshadri extends [26] by including transaction costs and modifications that use a 
complexity-penalizing factor, a fitness function that considers consistency of performance, and co-
evolution of a separate buy and sell rule. The authors managed to prove that the GP-evolved technical 
trading rules could outperform the buy-and-hold strategy by using additional factors and a fitness 
function in the model. The implementation of the GA algorithm is based on a C++ program available 
at http://lancet.mit.edu/ga/. 
3.4.8 Other Algorithms and Learning Schemes 
A. Generating rules using probability measures 
This approach generates an ordered sequence of simple and general rules. It produces an 
approximation to the best possible rule set (the one with the lowest probability measure - refer to 
Appendix C for more information on probability measure) for each outcome. It removes instances 
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from this rule set and repeats the process on the reduced instance set. This is done until no more 
instances are left. 
B. Basic Covering Algorithm 
This algorithm added tests to the rule under construction to improve accuracy. It chooses an 
attribute-value pair to maximize the probability of the desired classification. It attempts to include as 
many instances of the desired class as possible and to exclude instances from other classes. The new 
rule is chosen by maximizing the ratio of positive examples with respect to number of instances 
covered in the new rule. 
C. Rules formed by incremental reduced error pruning 
This algorithm splits the training data into a growing set that forms a rule using the basic covering 
algorithm and a pruning set that is used to evaluate the effect of a deleted test from the rule. It checks 
to see whether the truncated rule outperforms the original rule and stops when the rule cannot be 
improved any further. This process is repeated and the best rule is obtained for each class. The overall 
best rule is obtained by evaluating rules on the pruning set. 
D. Obtaining rules from partial decision trees 
This algorithm adopts the separate-and-conquer strategy to build a rule, remove instances it 
covers, and continue generating rules repeatedly for the remaining instances until no instances are 
left. However, this algorithm is different from the standard approach in the sense that only a partial 
decision tree is created. It splits a set of instances recursively into a partial tree. The leaf with the 
largest coverage is made into a rule and the tree is discarded. 
E. Model tree induction (numeric prediction- regression tree) 
This algorithm is to build a decision tree with numeric prediction where each leaf stores the 
average value of instances that reach the leaf (regression tree) or a linear regression model that 
predicts the class value of instances that reach the leaf (model tree). It builds an initial tree with the 
objective of minimizing the intra-subset variation in the class values down each branch, and the 
pruning begins from each leaf just as with ordinary decision tree. 
F. Naive Bayesian learning scheme 
This is a simple way to represent, use, and learn probabilistic knowledge. It assumes 
independence among numeric model attributes. A kernel density estimation option can be used if 
there is no assumption available for the underlying distribution on the attribute values. 
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G. Decision Table learning scheme 
This method uses best-first search to find a good subset of attributes for splitting purposes to be 
used in other learning algorithms. 
H. Instance-based learner 
This learning scheme is based on the goal of determining which member of the training set is 
closest to an unknown test instance. The class is predicted for the test instance once the nearest 
training instance has been located. It employs the Euclidean distance metric and is easier to use if the 
attributes are numeric. 
I. Algorithm for bagging 
This algorithm combines various models into a single prediction model. It gives equal weights to 
each model (each learning scheme) and attempts to neutralize the instability of learning methods by 
creating random samples from the original training data through replication and deletion of instances. 
J. Algorithm for boosting 
This algorithm seeks to combine multiple models that complement one another. It uses voting 
(for classification) and averaging (for prediction) to combine the output of individual models and 
combines models of the same type. Unlike bagging, boosting weights a model's contribution by its 
performance rather than assigning equal weights to all models. 
3.4.9 Concluding Remarks on Genetic Programming 
From this preliminary account of genetic algorithms and genetic programming, genetic 
programming appears to be a promising machine learning tool for financial economics. It can be 
applied to any investment decision-making analysis once we have a set of historical data. After the 
decision rules are determined based on the profits of the portfolio, we can use the rules to make 
optimal investment decisions with current data. Thus, this can also be applied to utility companies, as 
they need to be able to mine the historical data (fuel prices, demand and supply, electricity prices, 
etc.) to come up with good decision rules that determine the optimal bidding prices and amounts of 
energy for sale. 
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3.4.10 Illustrative Example using Data Mining 
3.4.10.1 Model 5: Basic Classification Model 
This example is modeled based on ISO-NE available market data. Suppose we are GENCO 1 and 
we wish to sell electricity by just considering the fuel price (natural gas), forecasted electricity price 
(NEPOOL) and Average Heat Rate. Suppose our IO (fuput Output) curve, IHR (fucremental Heat 
Rate), and AHR (Average Heat Rate) are represented as follows [38, 39]: 
Our objective function (OF) is simple: 
TQ = q 2 +q+18 
dTQ 
IRR= --= 2q + 1 
dq 
TQ 18 
AHR=-=q+l+-
q q 
Max Pe* q- Pgq* AHR 
q 
FOC : q * = p e - pg 
2pg 
This is the quantity to bid for maximum profit and if the margin is negative, GENCO 1 does not 
bid at all. The sample data and bidding decision for 42 days are shown in the following table. 
Forecasted fuel price taken from Tennessee Zone 6 (Fig. 3.17) and the Real-Time Locational 
Marginal Price from NEPOOL (Fig. 3.18). The missing days for gas prices (weekends and holidays) 
are replaced with the gas price of the prior day. For example, prices for 5/22/2004 - 5/23/2004 are 
based on the price on 5/21/2004. With reference to TABLE 3.3, quantity is calculated based on the 
FOC of the objective function: q=(pe-Pg)/(2*pg). Run Hour Revenue is the product of electricity price 
and quantity decision: Pe *q. Run Hour Margin or Profit is calculated directly from the objective 
function: Pe *q - pg *q* AHR. Final bidding decision is determined if profit is positive: YES if Run 
Hour Margin > 0, NO otherwise. 
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Fig. 3.17. Forecasted fuel price. 
(Source: Tennessee Zone 6 Physical Gas Prices from Natural Gas Intelligence (NG!): http://www.intelligencepress.com!) 
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Fig. 3.18. Forecasted electricity price. 
(Source: NEPOOL Real-Time LMP from ISO New England: http://www.iso-ne.com/) 
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TABLE3.3: 
Data and bidding decisions for 42 days. 
Quantity AHR 
Final Decision 
Date Profit($) Yes if Profit>O 
(MWh) (MMBtu/MWh) 
No if Profit <=0 
5/20/2004 4.94 9.58 42.95 yes 
5/21/2004 4.90 9.57 4L45 yes 
5/22/2004 4.31 9.49 4.29 yes 
5/23/2004 3.77 9.54 -26.05 no 
512412004 3.49 9.65 -40.30 no 
5/25/2004 3.57 9.61 -37.42 no 
512612004 3.56 9.61 -38.54 no 
5127/2004 3.65 9.58 -33.26 no 
5/2812004 5.26 9.68 64.98 yes 
5/29/2004 2.78 10.25 -69.08 no 
5/30/2004 3.81 9.53 -23.48 no 
5/3112004 4.14 9.49 -5.54 no 
6/112004 4.21 9.49 -1.69 no 
612/2004 5.24 9.67 64.08 yes 
6/3/2004 3.60 9.60 -34.58 no 
6/412004 3.82 9.53 -23.54 no 
61512004 4.01 9.50 -13.24 no 
6/6/2004 4.59 9.51 21.30 yes 
6n12004 4.17 9.49 -3.91 no 
6/8/2004 4.91 9.58 40.72 yes 
6/9/2004 5.43 9.74 79.47 yes 
6/10/2004 3.76 9.55 -25.20 no 
6/1112004 3.65 9.58 -30.53 no 
6/12/2004 5.12 9.64 53.72 yes 
6/13/2004 3.32 9.74 -45.51 no 
6/14/2004 4.29 9.49 2.66 yes 
6/15/2004 5.86 9.93 108.26 yes 
6/16/2004 5m 9.62 52.53 yes 
6/17/2004 5.52 9.78 86.89 yes 
6/18/2004 4.87 9.57 40.28 yes 
611912004 3.58 9.61 -36.49 no 
612012004 3.91 9.51 -19.38 no 
6/21/2004 3.48 9.65 -40.31 no 
6/22/2004 3.28 9.77 -50.08 no 
6/23/2004 3.55 9.62 -36.37 no 
6/24/2004 3.72 9.56 -27.95 no 
6125/2004 7.70 11.04 280.54 yes 
612612004 3.72 9.56 -28.19 no 
6/27/2004 3.79 9.54 -24.85 no 
6/28/2004 3.49 9.65 -38.37 no 
6/29/2004 3.82 9.53 -22.17 no 
6/30/2004 3.74 9.55 -25.63 no 
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Using C4.5 to determine whether GENCO 1 will bid or not, based on the available data 
Suppose we are the competitor and we wish to estimate whether GENCO 1 will bid or not bid. 
However, different estimation rules are generated when different data is used. Using the Weka3.2 
(Java) program, we obtained 3 different decision trees depending on what variables are excluded from 
the data. 
When all the data is used (Case 1), the decision to bid depends on the quantity scheduled. We 
know that this quantity scheduled is dependent on the price of fuel and electricity, therefore, we run 
the data mining tool on the same set of data by excluding the quantity variable. This leads us to Case 
2, where the decision to bid is based on profit. However, the rule generated using profit is not 
intuitive because if profit is negative, we still bid. Therefore, we exclude both the quantity and profit 
variables in Case 3 and discovered the rule that is dependent on the price of electricity. 
I Quantity 
QuanHty7 
~ (a) Case 1: All the data 
BID 
Profit 
(b) Case 2: Excluding 'Quantity' 
Forecasted Electricity 
Price 
(c) Case 3: Excluding 'Quantity' and 'Profit' 
Fig. 3.19. Decision trees for the bidding model. 
BID 
BID 
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TABLE3.4: 
Statistics for 3 different cases. 
Case 1and2 
Correctly Classified Instances 40 95.2381 % 
Incorrectly Classified Instances 2 4.7619 % 
Case3 
Correctly Classified Instances 41 97.619 % 
Incorrectly Classified Instances 1 2.381 % 
We wish to discover rules that are associated with exogenous variables because these endogenous 
variables (quantity and profit) are dependent on prices. From the rules generated, we discovered that 
Case 3 gives the best results. It is 97.62% accurate on the same set of data and only incorrect 1 day 
out of the 42 sample days used. This positive result has shown that evolutionary algorithm can indeed 
perform well under the specified data set and assumptions. Therefore, we would like to apply this 
concept to a market with multiple participants and multiple bidding rounds. 
A dynamic economic model was developed and will be discussed next. 
3.4.10.2 Model 6: Dynamic Economic Model 
Consider a GENCO 5 that decides to purchase raw data from ABC Corporation in order to data 
mine the behavior of the other market participants. The auction structure for the market is a sealed-
bid, second-price auction where 4 other market participants are bidding to sell the same amount of 
electricity. Each of the market participant's behavior is known to the modeler. The auction is 
simulated for 150 time periods. The highest bid determines the winner and the 2nd highest price is the 
actual price paid to the winner. 
GENCO 5 decides to use the WEKA data mining tool to infer the bidding strategies for each 
market participant, hoping to use this result as its bidding policy. In a general sense, GENCO 5 is 
faced with making short-run profit-maximizing decision about whether to bid or not and, if so, what 
the bid price should be. 
The Auction Structure 
An auction market is a market institution with an explicit set of rules that determine resource 
allocations and prices on the basis of bids from market participants [35]. Assume four different 
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GENCOs attempt to maximize their profits by submitting price bids for the same amount of 
electricity. This one-sided auction assumes all GENCOs sell at zero cost and ignores the technical 
aspects of the generating units. Since there is no cost incurred and the price is the only determinant of 
the profit-maximizing objective, this auction is cleared with the highest bidder (the one that 
maximizes the profit of the winner). However, the market price is determined using the 2nd highest 
auction price to allow for bidders to choose strategies to maximize their expected gain. In general, 
this auction is known as a sealed-bid, second price auction where 4 other market participants are 
trying to win the sale. Ignoring all other technical constraints, this model is generated using STELLA 
software. Thus, the algorithm for determining the market price is as follows: 
MARKET PRICE= IF MAX BID=B1 THEN MAX (B2, B3, B4) 
ELSE IF MAX BID=B2 THEN MAX (Bi. B3, B4) 
ELSE IF MAX BID=B3 THEN MAX (B1, B2, B4) 
ELSE MAX (B 1, B2, B3) 
Each GENCO starts bidding based on its' own private risk perception known as the PRPi and 
assigns different probabilities, P(Bi), to its own PRPi. In addition, there is also a reserved value Ri 
where it determines the reservation price for each GENCO. 
TABLE3.5: 
The values used for each variable in the model. 
Bi PRPi P(BJ Ri 
1 0.8 0.6 3 
2 0.6 0.2 1 
3 0.3 0.9 4 
4 0.5 0.6 5 
There is another variable, Qi. that measures the market risk perceived by each player. This 
variable is linearly related to the market history, where market history is the difference between the 
bid and the market price. For instance, for GENCO 1, Q1(t) is a linear function of B1(t-l) - Market 
Price (t-1) as shown below. 
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B 1(t-1)-Market Price(t-1) 
Fig. 3.20. Linear relationship between niarket risk perceived by each player versus the difference 
between the market clearing price and own bidding price. 
The bidding strategies employed by the 4 market participants are: 
• GENCO 1: Catch up with market signals and overbid just enough to be the high bidder. 
This is a random initial value that takes the product of the reservation value and the 
weighted risk perception. 
o Subsequent bids follow the following algorithm: 
Where B1(old) = 
IF B1 5: 1.25 · R1 THEN IF B1 = MAXBID THEN - R1 • (1- P( B1 )) • Q1 
ELSE - R1 • (1- P( B1 )) • Q1 +RANDOM (0,.1) 
ELSE B1 S: 1.25 · R1 
This simply means that if the previous bid is less than the reservation price, which is 
the constant multiplied by the reservation value, Ri> then the bid for the next period is 
incremented by the random number generator. If the bid is greater than the 
reservation price, then set the bid to be less than that. The bid for the next period is 
just the addition of the current bid and the previous bid stored. 
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• GENCO 2: Catch up with market signals but decision is dependent on prior result. If it loses, 
it will bid slightly lower and bid higher if it wins the sale in the last period. 
o Initial bid: sg = R2 • ( 1- P( B2 ) • PRF'z ) 
This is a random initial value that incorporates the product of the reservation value 
and the weighted risk perception. 
o Subsequent bids follow the following algorithm: 
Bz(t+l) = B2(t) + B2(old) 
Where B2(old) = 
IF B2 ~ 1.25 · R2 THEN IF B2 = MAXBID THEN - R2 • (1- P( B2 )) • Q2 
ELSE - R2 • (1- P( B2 )) • Q2 +RANDOM (0,.05) 
ELSE B2 ~1.25 · R2 
This is similar to GENCO 1 's strategy except for the different variance used for the 
random number generator. 
• GENCO 3: Catch up with market signal similarly to GENCO 2. The only distinctions here 
are the difference in private risk perception and reservation value used. 
This is a random initial value that takes the product of the reservation value and the 
weighted risk perception. 
o Subsequent bids follow the following algorithm: 
B3(t+l) = B3(t) + B3(old) 
Where B3(old) = 
IF B3 ~1.25 · R3 THEN IF B3 = MAXBID THEN - R3 • (1- P( B3 )) · Q3 
ELSE - R3 • (1- P( B3 )) • Q3 +RANDOM ( 0,.05) 
ELSE B3 ~1.25 · R3 
• GENCO 4: Bid at random. 
o Initial bid: B~ = R4 • (1- P( B4 ) · PRP4 ) 
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This is a random initial value that takes the product of the reservation value and the 
weighted risk perception. 
o Subsequent bids follow the following algorithm: 
where Bi old)= - R4 ·(1- P( B4 ))· Q4 + RANDOM(-.5,.3). 
The general model of the auction: 
Price 
,...-······\Max Profit 
·· ....•..... / 
Figure 3.21. Auction structure. B; is bidder i. 
Each GENCO will have a profit function that is dependent upon the reservation value and its bid if it 
wins, where n(R,., B. ) = Ri - Bi and 0 if it does not win. The general model for the each bidder i : 
l R. 
l 
P(B-.) 
IJ~·°'\. 
r ~ " . -;~~ 
""¥·--~'*'~/ 
Figure 3.22. General model for each bidder i. 
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The auction was simulated for 150 time periods and the results are as follows: 
11 L. 3: 
4: 
r: FROFIT FCT I 2: PROFIT FCT 2 1: PROF lT FCT ·3 4: PROFIT FCT 4 
··························i··························1················· 
l 
! 
! 
j 
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~.~:+-------+------~i...-____ __,...-____ __,i 
0.00 37.51l 75.03 nz. oo i.so.oo 
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Fig. 3.23. Profit functions for the 4 GENCOs for 150 time periods. 
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Fig. 3.24. Bidding prices and market prices for 150 time periods. 
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Fig. 3.25. Winning bidder for each period for time length of 150 periods. 
Interestingly, GENCO 3 and GENCO 4 are the two dominant players in this market structure 
and GENCO 2 is bid out of the market first. The market price seems to fluctuate around $3.61. Notice 
that GENCO 4 has a random profit function because it bids in a random manner. The results show 
that GENCO 3 is the eventual winner in this auction. The profit function also informs us that GENCO 
1 makes losses for the 1st quarter of the time period and loses out in the race after that. GENCO 2 
generates zero profit while GENCO 3 and 4 generate positive profit but GENCO 4 outperforms 
GENCO 3. However, there seems to be a tough competition between GENCO 4 and GENCO 3 
towards the end of the bidding period. 
Consider a GENCO 5 who attempts to data mine these 4 GENCOs in the market. It uses a 
data mining tool which will be discussed in the next section to study the behavior of the market and 
attempts to outbid these 4 other GENCOs using the results found. 
Data Mining Model 
Data mining refers to the process of transforming collected raw data into usable information. 
Although data in its raw form is of limited use, it can be manipulated to realize its potential. Raw data 
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can be aggregated and analyzed, together with heuristic knowledge about the nature of the problem, 
providing significant information that can be acted upon in making informed decisions. 
GENCO 5 uses the WEKA data mining library to infer the bidding strategies for all the other 4 
market participants. It attempts to forecast the data trends from the raw data that it purchased from the 
market. The data includes four bids for each of 150 auctions, the market price, and which bid was the 
winning bid for each time slot. The data will be analyzed for trends such as which bid won in relation 
to market price and where the bid fell. The trends would then be applied to a second set of data to test 
the accuracy of the trends found. Given these, GENCO 5 formulates its own bidding behavior. The 
algorithm used is the MS Rules because it generates a decision list for regression problems and can 
handle numerical values. In this algorithm, the model tree is built for each iteration using M5 and 
makes the "best" leaf into a rule. GENCO 5 runs this on the maximum bid, market price and the bids 
submitted by other GENCOs for each auction, assuming that this data has been purchased. 
Forecasting Results 
The forecasted trends varied in accuracy. The prediction for market price was extremely accurate, 
with predicted values being within 1 % of the actual value. The average error rate was in the range of 
0.057%. B4 was also predicted within 1 % of the actual value with an average error rate of 0.25%. 
However, the regression output for B3 did not perform as well as the other two with an average error 
rate of 2.395%. All the rules generated are shown in the Appendix. 
Using Forecasting Trends to Outperform Other Market Participants 
Since we know that GENCO 1 and GENCO 2 eventually lose out in the race, we are only 
concerned with the bids of GENCO 3 and GENCO 4. The rule generated for GENCO 4 is as follows: 
B4= 
0.0088 * B1 
+ 0.0087 * B3 
+ 0.9763 * MarketPrice 
+ 0.0075 * B1(old) 
+ 0.0052 * MAXBID 
+ 0.9992 * Q4 
+0.0031 [150/1.178%] 
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For GENCO 3, we found the following regression equation: 
B3= 
0.9781 * MarketPrice 
+ 0.0001 * Wi14 
+ 0.0118 * Q1 
-0.0198 * Qz 
+ 1.02 * Q3 
+ 0.0403 [150/1.404%] 
We also need to forecast the market price from the results that we discovered: 
MarketPrice = 1.0026 * B1 - 1.004 * Q1 -0.0088 [150/1.669%] 
Assume that the data set that we purchased has the following information set: {Bi. B2, B3, B4, 
MAXBID, Qi. Q2, Q3, Q4, Wini. Win2, Win3, and Wi14}. Our generated algorithm would be to 
outperform both GENCO 3 and GENCO 4 (depending on which GENCO submits the highest bid). 
Market price does not play a significant role here due to the auction structure although it is used as an 
input to our model. It can also be used to verify our bid price so that it does not fall below the next 
forecasted market price. With the forecasted regression output for Bid4, Bid3, and Market Price, the 
GENCO 5 bidding algorithm will be: 
Compute Bs() { 
Bs(old) = Bs; 
If win= TRUE 
return Es, 
} 
else 
F orecast_M arketPrice _B LBi ); 
lf B4 > B3 
Bs = Markup*B4; 
Else 
Bs = Markup*B3; 
Return Bs; 
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The Markup variable determines how much we want to bid above the maximum price bidder. We 
set this as 0.02 which is 2% higher than the highest bidder, just enough to overbid that bidder. With 
this algorithm, we can see that GENCO 5 follows the movements of GENCO 4 and GENCO 3 
closely and manages to win most of the time. 
Fig. 3.26. Plot of bids for GENCO 3, GENCO 4, GENCO 5 and market clearing price. 
From our results, GENCO 5 only loses 10/150 times which is 6.67%. It means that 93.33% of 
the time, we win the sale. Our data mining model has shown that we can outperform the competitors 
if we can transform available raw data into useful information. Therefore, the complete algorithm to 
perform an informed bidding strategy first selects the data and if it is real data, has some cleaning and 
filtering to perform (preprocessing). Then, tlie data mining regression analysis is run on the data, and 
accuracy tests performed on the results. We next develop our own bidding strategy based on the 
regression results and simulate a new auction from those results and the new bidding strategy. If 
results are satisfactory, we enter the market. Otherwise, we may have selected incomplete data, wrong 
data or data has not been cleansed properly. These can be summarized in the following 7 steps. 
Informed bidding algorithm 
Step I: Data selection and cleaning 
Step 2: Perform regression analysis on data 
Step 3: Peiform accuracy tests on regression results 
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Step 4: Develop own bidding strategy 
Step 5: Simulate new auction with informed bidding strategy 
Step 6: If result is satisfactory, go to Step 7 
Else go to Step 1 (Incomplete I inaccurate data) 
Step 7: Bid into the market 
However, this simulation does not include the cost of generation. It is just to verify if the hidden 
patterns needed for us to bid can be found. Therefore, this needs to be extended to include cost of 
generation for all the bidders and GENCO 5 as well. In addition, we would also need to generate the 
appropriate quantity for bidding. However, the information that we data mine comes with a cost. In 
the next chapter, we will discuss about how to justify this cost with respect to profit. If the data 
acquired is too expensive, it is better not to bid. Even though we may win most of the time, we may 
not be able to recapture high data· acquisition costs. 
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CHAPTER4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
In the previous chapter we laid out the various types of methodologies employed in the 6 different 
models generated. All the approaches proposed can be used as bidding strategies depending on the 
different assumptions used. However, we have not mentioned how dependency relationships affect 
our decision, as well as how we determine the most favorable bids given the range of feasible bids 
that were discovered. This chapter begins with the discussion of dependency relationship based on a 
model presented in Chapter 3, followed by the different optimal bids used for different decision 
criteria specified based on extreme scenarios, average scenarios, and also utility curves. Finally, we 
will discuss the value of information, how it reduces the uncertainty and where information sources 
can be obtained. 
4.1 The Effects of the Dependency Relationship 
Independence between GENCO 2's bids has been assumed in the model discussed in Section 3.2. 
The correlation that may exist between the two bids of GENCO 2 was ignored. But in the actual 
market, correlation and other dependency relationships can exist not only in the fuel prices of 
generation units using the same fuel type, but also among generation units employing different fuels, 
as well as for other reasons. 
Referring to model 2 in the previous chapter, suppose that generator A and generator B of 
GENCO 2 are not independent of each other, but instead have some other dependency relationship. 
This dependency relationship between the two generators might be describable as positively 
correlated, negatively correlated, might have a numerical correlation value, etc. Suppose F2A and F28 
are positively correlated such that a high sample value S2A drawn from F2A strongly suggests a high 
sample of S28 and F28, and vice versa. In the decision tree for this model, GENCO l's decision is not 
affected by this dependency relationship because each branch whose EMV depends on S2A (the low 
range bid) does not depend on S28• Similarly, each branch whose EMV depends on S28 does not 
depend on S2A. S2A and S28 might be related in some way, but that does not alter GENCO l's decision 
because no matter how S28 depends on S2A. the optimal decision made by GENCO 1 is still the same. 
Similarly if F2A and Fw are negatively, partially or perfectly correlated, the decision tree remains 
unchanged with comparable reasoning, thus producing equivalent optimal bids. In conclusion, the 
underlying dependency relationship between the two random variables describing the two 
competitor's bids is completely irrelevant in this particular model. 
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4.2 Decision Criteria: Determining the Bid 
The ultimate goal in choosing a bid price is to optimize its utility to the business. Often, this 
means maximizing the expected monetary value (EMV) of a bid decision. However the goal of 
maximizing EMV may be tempered by aversion to risk. fudividuals employed to make bids may not 
wish to jeopardize their bidding records with risky bids, and risk aversion may affect company 
decisions of high enough value, such as those relevant to value at risk (VaR), capital budgeting, etc. 
Next, we discuss methods for deciding on a bid in the example discussed earlier. Some of these may 
appear reasonable at first glance, but less so after a closer look. 
4.2.1 Optimistic and Pessimistic Bids 
Referring to Figure 4.1, if one knows the correct EMV curve, then the coordinates of the 
maximum of that curve defines the optimum bid (the x coordinate), and its EMV (they coordinate). 
This figure also shows that the optimum bid differs for different EMV curves. Example optimum bids 
shown are the x-axis values of points "A," "B," and "C." fu this example, the optimum bid increases 
for EMV curves with higher y-axis trajectories. Although the proper bid may be read off the graph 
when the applicable EMV curve is known (which will be the case when the proper CDP for GENCO 
2's low/high/both bids are known), the situation is less clear when the proper CDP, and thus the 
proper EMV curve, is not known. 
EMV 
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Fig. 4.1. Family of EMV curves corresponding to different decision criteria. 
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In order to address bidding when the proper EMV curve is not known, let us begin by observing 
that the family of possible EMV curves is bounded from below by one such curve. We term this the 
pessimistic curve. Similarly the family is bounded from above by another EMV curve, termed the 
optimistic curve. Suppose the best bid is chosen under the assumption that the pessimistic curve 
applies. Then the point with coordinates that state the optimum bid and its EMV is labeled "A." If the 
horizontally averaged curve (this curve will be discussed in more details later) applies, then the actual 
EMV is higher (point "B''). While a higher EMV is of course welcome, it is however not as high as it 
would have been had the optimistic curve been known to apply and the bid chosen accordingly (point 
"C"). 
One alternative to basing bid choice on the pessimistic curve is to base it on the optimistic curve. 
The best bid in that case is the x-axis value of point "C." However this bid is problematic because of 
the consequences if the pessimistic curve actually is the one that applies. In that case the EMV of the 
bid will be the height of point "F," which is so low it is below the bottom of the graph. Had the 
pessimistic curve been known to apply then the bid would have been determined by point "A." 
Therefore in this case the suboptimality of a bid based on the optimistic curve would be the difference 
in height between points "A" and "F." Similarly, if some EMV curve between the pessimistic and 
optimistic curves applies unbeknownst to the bidder, then the bid would still be suboptimal, though 
less so. 
Another alternative is base the bid on some EMV curve between the pessimistic and optimistic 
curves. The same reasoning just described will show that if the actual EMV curve is different from 
the assumed EMV curve, either above it or below it, the bid will be suboptimal to some degree. 
4.2.2 Averaging Scenarios for Bidding 
This category of decision criteria identifies a single curve from the family of possibilities. In 
doing so, the point is to identify that curve which will do the best job ofrepresenting the entire family 
in the sense of ultimately leading to the most reasonable decision of what to bid. Averaging may be 
applied to the CDF envelopes for competitor's bid (Fig. 4.2) or directly to the EMV curves (Fig. 4.1 ). 
The horizontal averaging strategy to define a representative curve describing the CDF of the 
competitor's bid is calculated as follows. For each of a sufficiently large number of values F( )=y for 
cumulative probability in the range [0,1] in Fig. 4.2, compute an x-axis value as the mean of the x-
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axis values of the left and right envelopes at y-axis value. This corresponds to the curve specified by 
'H' in Fig. 4.1. This maximum EMV associated with this curve then would be the bid implied by 
horizontal averaging. 
The horizontal averaging strategy just described seems at first glance to make neither more nor 
less sense than its vertical dual. Hence it is useful to define the dual strategy and compare the two. 
The vertical averaging strategy is like the horizontal averaging just described, except for how the 
points on the averaged curve are computed. Here, for each of a representative set of x-axis values, the 
y-axis values of each envelope are found, and their midpoint used to define a point on the vertically 
averaged curve. The result is curve "Vertical Average" in Fig. 4.2. This curve implies EMV curve 
"V" in Fig. 4.1. The maximum EMV associated with this curve then would be the bid implied by 
vertical averaging. 
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Fig. 4.2. Different averaging curves applied to the CDF envelopes for the competitor's bids. 
Because of the differences in the results implied by horizontal and vertical averaging, a third form 
of averaging was implemented that gives a fair combination of both of these. It works by averaging 
the horizontally averaged curve Fh and the vertically averaged curve Fv- However, this requires 
specifying how this third averaging step is to be done. If it was done by vertical averaging, the result 
would be different than if it was done by horizontal averaging, which would defeat the intent of a 
hybrid average the result of which does not depend on making a choice of vertical vs. horizontal 
averaging. Therefore, the third averaging step is to obtain two new curves, one by horizontally 
averaging Fh and Fv and one by vertically averaging them. These new curves are then averaged again 
the same way to produce another two curves. After repeating this process a number of times, the pair 
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of curves resulting from all the iterations converges to a single curve. This is termed the fixed-point 
average curve, and the procedure, fixed-point averaging. The result is shown as the "Iterative 
Average" curve. In this case, we avoid strong assumptions about what kind of averaging is best by 
employing a hybrid averaging approach. This approach allows both horizontal and vertical averaging 
to affect the ultimate result. 
The resulting optimum bids and EMVs based on the three averaging methods are shown in Table 
4.1. The vertically averaged curve gives the lowest EMV, but the risk is less, and so is the loss if in 
fact another curve applies. The table shows that the horizontal averaging method generates a 
maximum possible loss giving the greatest downfall if in fact the actual curve is not anywhere near it. 
Therefore, it may be justified to use the iterative averaging curve because it takes into account the 
effects of both horizontal and vertical averages, giving a maximum possible loss in the range between 
the horizontal and the vertical averaging methods. 
TABLE4.1: 
Comparison of Averaging Methods. 
Method Optimal Bid EMV Maximum possible loss 
Horizontal Averaging $144.63/MWh 73238 2913.60 
Iterative Averaging $144.40/MWh 73080 1632.7 
Vertical Averaging $144.10/MWh 72512 358.71 
Relying on a CDF curve obtained by averagmg involves making assumptions that are not 
supported by the problem definition. Therefore results reflect the strategy of making assumptions as 
needed, just to get an answer. Nevertheless, the process does take into account 2nd_order uncertainty, 
embodied in the CDF envelopes describing the competitor's predicted bid. This must be regarded as 
an improvement over not taking 2nd -order uncertainty into account at all. 
4.2.3 Risk-Adjusted Bids 
Referring to the previously discussed options in determining the bids, one could be risk-averse 
and attempt to minimize loss, hence choosing the highest EMV based on the pessimistic curve. A 
very high risk taker would bid using the optimistic curve. In model 4, if GENCO 1 is risk-seeking, it 
would bid based on the high EMV curve, which predicts a yield of 74200 from a bid of 
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$146.25/MWh. From a risk-averse viewpoint, GENCO 1 would bid $143.9/MWh for an EMV value 
of 72195.25, the maximum of the low EMV curve. 
The amount of risk that each GENCO can bear depends on how much loss it can absorb and how 
much profit it needs to obtain. We can formulate a plot of maximum loss against maximum income. 
Then each EMV curve becomes a point on this plot. The newly plotted curve has a slope (which may 
vary over its length). The risk position determines a value for slope, and the coordinate at which it 
occurs determines the EMV curve whose maximum determines the right bid, assuming a 
monotonically decreasing slope. Presumably a slope of 1 corresponds to risk-neutrality. However this 
assumes maximum income and maximum loss characterize the problem adequately. 
We have not eliminated the uncertainty entirely. It is only wise to seek more information in the 
hope of reducing the bounds on these curves, leading to a smaller decision space that may lead to 
more dependable results. 
4.3 Value of Information: Informed vs. Uninformed Bidder 
In our models, the bidder is expected to perform better provided they are informed about factors 
impacting the competitor's bids. However, the acquisition of this kind of information involves costs 
that may exceed the expected benefit. Therefore, the bidder must decide whether or not to acquire 
information to alter the optimal bid. The information gap decision concept tells us what is known and 
what could be known. Given very sparse information, a "robustness" function describes immunity to 
failure. This function helps to facilitate the study of various trade-offs inherent in the decision. 
Acquisition of additional information can be expensive and depends on the value of the information. 
A comparison on how much gain we can get from the extra information will be discussed to justify 
the worth of acquiring possibly costly information. 
Since the acquisition of information requires an expenditure of resources, the question then is 
how to gauge the value of the information. With reference to model 4 again, suppose new information 
leads us to a more informative info-gap model Unew which is a subset of U (a, w )={ w: w::; I w +al} 
mentioned earlier. Since Unew is more informative, then this implies a model which is likely to be 
more robust. In the bidding example, a larger range of bids is likely to be feasible (Fig. 4.4). 
Clearly more information is good to have. This can be quantified. Suppose that the additional 
information results in improved bounds on the behavior of the system as shown in Fig. 4.4. For the 
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same critical reward re with a pessimistic decision criteria, we can bid at a higher price, with the 
increase denoted by LIB. On the other hand, if we do not bid higher but instead use the same bid 
shown earlier, we enjoy a higher minimum EMV. The change in EMV is shown in Fig. 4.4 by L1EMV. 
From the graph, the exact values are determined. 
LIB= $144.70/MWh - $144.40/MWh = $0.30/MWh 
L1EMV = $72268.80 - $71447.93 = $820.87 
This change of EMV value determines our demand value of information. This is the increment of 
reward which can be demanded after acquiring new information. In economic sense, the decision 
maker would be willing to pay any quantity up to, but not more than, this increment in reward, 
$820.87 in this case, in exchange for the information. However, raw data alone does not equal 
additional useful information because we need resources to data mine the data. Thus, this demand 
value of information has to include not only the cost of the raw data purchased but also the costs of 
transforming the raw data into useful information. 
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Fig. 4.3. A plot of the original info-gap reward curve versus the more informative info-gap 
reward curve that is found with additional information. 
4.3.1 Sources of Information 
Now that we know how to quantify additional information, we need to know where to obtain the 
relevant data. A list of 45 information sources has been collected and is shown in the Appendix D. 
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CHAPTERS. CONCLUSIONS 
This analysis has accomplished the objectives of this thesis by the 6 models presented in Chapter 
3. We applied the decision tree approach to solve the fundamental basic bidding problem with three 
different scenarios, namely perfect information, with uncertainty, and with an increase in demand. We 
have also showed that the effect of the dependency relationship between bids can be irrelevant in 
determining an optimal bid. In the described model, if the domains of the probability density 
functions for the competitor's two bids are non-overlapping, the optimal bid is not affected by the 
correlation of the generation units, regardless of their underlying distributions. Where this situation 
applies, a market participant may ignore a significant form of uncertainty about its competitor without 
degradation in the quality of its bids. 
This thesis also shows how Information Gap Decision Theory can serve as a decision support tool 
that assists in quantifying severe uncertainty when information is scarce and expensive. It can help 
decision makers to develop preferences, assess risks and opportunities, and seek information, given a 
minimum required level of reward. This minimum level of reward could be determined by 
incorporating risk management methodologies such as Value at Risk or Profit at Risk. 
This research shows that data mining using an evolutionary technique can be used to infer rivals' 
strategy. As mentioned in the earlier section, data mining seeks to discover hidden patterns that can 
inform the analyst about the strategy or types of generating unit used. The first data mining approach 
used in this research was rule or decision tree induction to deduce the pattern discovered from the 
data. It produces patterns that relate to the bidding decision made or other data fields (attributes). The 
resulting patterns are typically generated as a tree with splits on data fields and terminal points (leafs). 
In order to study the bidding behavior of a supplier, we first use this rule induction to separate the 
active (when bid is submitted) bid-quantity-price group from the passive (when no bids are 
submitted) group. Later we have extended the data mining technique to include more market 
participants in a multiple period auction. Based on the data generated from the deterministic 4 market 
participant environment, we have managed to forecast the bid prices of the dominant market players 
as well as the market clearing price. In tum, we have developed the best bidding strategy based on the 
discovered information. When we enter the market as the 5th participant, we managed to outperform 
the two dominant GENCOs assuming that their bidding behaviors do not change. 
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5.1 Future Work 
The models that have been developed are fairly simple and thus more technical constraints should 
be included, such as the ramp rates and start up and shut down times. We also need to include other 
uncertainties such as generation outages. We need to understand how to balance the cost of new 
information with its benefit. Information Gap Theory is an important tool to quantify uncertainty and 
it can be applied towards the data mining process to further assist in developing bids. It is very naive 
to assume that the behaviors of each market participant do not change because these GENCOs are 
intelligent agents and they will learn as they bid and may further improve their strategies in every 
bidding round. Future work will include learning algorithms such as reinforcement learning into their 
bids. Since the electricity market is an entire network of the interactions within the energy and the 
electricity markets, one should model the bidding problem as regions rather than a single point 
analysis. Other stochastic methods such as Bayesian networks can be further explored for this kind of 
analysis. 
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APPENDIX B. ENTROPY, INFORMATION GAIN AND INFORMATION GAIN 
RATIO 
Bl. Entropy-based Attribute Selection 
Let S be a set of tuples from m classes - Ci.C2, ... ,Cu,. Then the number of tuples in S is ISi = ISd + IS21 
+ ... + !Sml, where Si is the set of tuples from class Ci. The entropy of the class distribution in S (or the 
average information needed to classify an arbitrary tuple) is: 
. l(S) = -P(C1)xlog2P(C1)-P(C2)xlog2P(C2)-... -P(Cn)xlog2P(C0 ), 
where P(Ci) = !SilJISI 
B2. Information Gain 
The formula to calculate information gain is: 
gain(A) = l(S) - l(A) 
Where l(A) represents the information in the split. For example, suppose that attribute A splits S into 
k subsets - Ai.A2, ••• ,Ak (each A having the same value for A). Then the information in the split, 
based on the values of A is: 
The most relevant attribute is the one with maximal information gain. 
B3. Information Gain Ratio 
Information gain ratio is developed to avoid overfitting. Gain ratio takes the number of branches into 
account when choosing an attribute. The formula is given by: 
gain_ratio(A) = gain(A)/I(A) 
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APPENDIX C. ALGORITHMS 
Cl. The ID3 Algorithm 
Inputs: (D, A, C), where D is a dataset with only nominal instance attributes A and C is the class 
attribute 
Output: a decision tree T representing a sequential decision process for classifying instances 
(predicting the values of the class attribute C); each node of T is labeled with a non-class attribute of 
A 
Informal Inductive Bias: minimize the average height of the tree 
Procedure: 
if the set of remaining non-class attributes is empty OR if all of the instances in D are in the same 
class 
else { 
return an empty tree 
compute the class entropy of each attribute over the dataset D 
let a* be an attribute with minimum class entropy 
create a root node for a tree T; label it with a* 
} 
for each value b of attribute a* 
} 
let T(a*=b) be the tree computed recursively by ID3 on input (Dla*=b, A-a*, C), where: 
Dla*=b contains all instances of D for which a* has the value b 
A-a* consists of all attributes of A except a* 
attach T(a*=b) to the root ofT as a subtree 
return the resulting decision tree T 
C2. The C4.5 Algorithm 
FormTree(T) 
ComputeClassFrequency(T); 
If OneClass or FewCases 
Return a leaf; 
Create a decision node N; 
ForEach Attribute A 
ComputeGain(A); 
N. test= Attribute WithBestGain; 
If N.test is continuous 
find Threshold; 
ForEach T' in the splitting of T 
If T' is Empty 
Child of N is a leaf 
Else 
Child of N = FormTree(T'); 
ComputeErrors of N; 
RetumN 
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C3. Algorithm to Generate Rules Using Probability Measure 
Initialize E to the instance set 
Until E is empty do 
For each class C for which E contains an instance 
Use the basic covering algorithm to create the best perfect rule for class C 
Calculate the probability measure m(R) for the rule, and for the rule with the final 
condition omitted m(R-) 
While m(R-) < m(R), remove the final condition from the rule and repeat the 
previous step 
From the rules generated, select the one with the smallest m(R) 
Print the rule 
Remove the instances covered by the rule from E 
Continue 
Formula to calculate probability measure: 
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pq oft caresselecred at random, exactly i are in class cl ~ ( ~ )f i) n 
min(t,P) 
m(R) = L Pr[ of t cases selected at random, exactly i are in class c] 
i=p 
p: number of instances of that class that the rule selects 
t: total number of instances that the rule selects 
P: total number of instances of that class in the dataset 
T: total number of instances in the dataset 
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APPENDIX D. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SOURCES ON PHYSICAL POWER 
PLANT CHARACTERISTICS AND ECONOMIC DATA RELEVANT TO THE 
POWER INDUSTRY 
The objective of this bibliography is to present a survey on how much information is available to 
the public and what are the existing services that help the operational plans of power companies. 
Information gathered on power utilities range from their production costs, demand and supply, actual 
and planned capacity, input and output prices, forecast demand/supply and etc. Types of information 
gathered are subdivided into 4 groups: 
• Public - free information to the general public 
• Membership - free information for members 
• Pay-for - requires additional fee for information 
• Service - sells products and services pertaining to investment and production plans 
• Trading - a place for energy market participants to obtain market information and to trade 
contracts and/or commodities. 
The following section presents a list of resources found in alphabetically order with explanations 
on the services and data provided by each resource. 
Alphabetical Listings 
ALTOS Management Partners Inc. 
Homepage: http://www.altosmgmt.com/electric.htm; Category: Service 
ALTOS Management Partners Inc. provides services for business companies to perform well under a 
competitive environment. It has developed 3 different types of model: North American Regional 
Electric (NARE) model, World Gas Trade model, and North American Regional model. The NARE 
model consists of over 20,000 generation plants in North America. The input data obtained from 
sources such as Research Data Institute (RDI), Energy Systems and Design Ltd. (ES&D), Edison 
Electric Institute (EEi), and Energy Information Administration (EIA) is fed together with private 
consultations into the model for analysis. Employing microeconomic technique, this model attempts 
to forecast the hourly market-clearing price by the aggregate supply and demand curve from all 
existing generation plants. MarketpointTM is created for the purpose of this model, where it 
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generates output that indicates the market prices, the capacity to be run, the margin to be captured at 
each hour of run time, and the value of the plant. In general, this NARE is a model that reverse-
engineer competitors' market behavior in order to facilitate and plan for the production and 
investment activity of a generation plant. 
American Gas Association (AGA) 
Homepage: http://www.aga.org; Category: Membership/Pay-for 
There are 3 different categories of information provided by the American Gas Association (AGA). 
AGA collects and analyzes data on energy utilities and participants in the natural gas industry. 
Information on weekly statistics covers data on working gas in storage, heating and cooling degree. 
There is a very brief general natural gas profile on every state in the US. Rankings based on different 
categories (sales revenue, total customers and electric generation volumes) are provided free. Other 
gas facts, studies and hedging surveys pertaining to the natural gas industries are available through 
the website for members. Studies include data on consumers demand, supply, operations, 
transportation, issues, environment and technology. Interested buyers can purchase historical data 
books or publications via its Marketplace page. Publications include topics from engineering 
operations, gas industry issues, markets, and pipelines research to studies and statistics of the natural 
gas industry. 
American Petroleum Institute (API) 
Homepage: http://www.api.org; Category: Public/Pay{or 
American Petroleum Institute (API) is a primary trade association for the oil and natural gas industry. 
It provides industry statistics through an online service known as the ACCESS* API. There are four 
different categories of pay-for information available from this service, namely statistical reports, 
economic analysis, statistical services, and resources and links. 
Statistical reports cover petroleum statistics since 1919 with weekly and monthly information on 
refinery operations, production, imports, inventories, and analysis of recent developments. The 
sources available under statistical reports are: Basic petroleum data book, Imports and Exports of 
Crude Oil and Petroleum Products, Inventories of Natural Gas Liquids and Liquefied Refinery Gases, 
Joint Association Survey on Drilling Costs, Monthly Statistical Reports, Quarterly Well Completion 
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Report, Standard Definitions of Petroleum Statistics, Weekly Statistical Bulletin, and Sales of Natural 
Gas Liquids and Liquefied Refinery Gases. In the economic analysis, research is conducted on public 
policy issues and findings are reported. This category of information contains weekly gasoline prices, 
historical trends in gasoline prices, changes in major components of gasoline prices, and current state 
of the oil and gas industry. Statistical service consists of industry-wide surveys, software 
development, and benchmarking protocols. In general, they provide services such as compiling data, 
developing estimation methods, creating software and protocols that aid in the collection of statistical 
data. As the name suggests, resources and links provides a list of Internet sites that includes oil and 
gas statistics and studies. 
American Public Gas Association (APGA) 
Homepage: http://www.apga.org; Category: Public/Membership 
The American Public Gas Association (APGA) provides current gas prices and recent natural gas 
news. With membership access to the APGA website, members are able to obtain information on 
developments in operations, gas supply, marketing, salaries, rates, legislation, reports on supply, 
demand, price, and regulatory developments. Membership rates differ for public members and public 
gas associations/groups members. APGA provides a research and development program that is 
affiliated with Gas Technology Institute (GTI) to transfer developed natural gas technology to public 
gas systems. 
American Public Power Association (APPA) 
Homepage: http://www.appanet.org; Category: Public/Membership 
Obtained from sources such as U.S. Department of Energy and Energy Information Administration, 
the American Public Power Association (APPA) provides U.S. electric utility statistics to the general 
public. However, the information provided are not in depth and is merely geared towards an overall 
representation of the total number of electric utilities, largest utility companies, number of customers, 
utility rate, and electric revenue. APPA also has a current glossary of investor-owned utility names. 
Most information is represented graphically and is based on the year 2001. 
Regular and associate APPA members can enjoy the benefits of receiving the Public Power Weekly 
publication that features current issues and events in the power industry, the Public Power Magazine 
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that covers policy changes of publicly owned electric systems, and annual statistical reports on state 
and local public power utilities. 
Argus Media 
Homepage: http://www.argusonline.com/wwwrootlindex.jsp; Category: Public/Membership 
Argus Media provides live news, prices and information on global markets from oil, gas, electricity 
and coal to emissions and transportation. Argus Media has two units namely Petroleum Argus and 
Energy Argus. Petroleum Argus reports and assesses spot market prices on gas and oil while Energy 
Argus is mainly an analysis resource for the power industry covering information such as news, 
prices and developments in the industry. It has 19 different newsletters and 22 reports on various 
energy markets. To gain full access to its data files, newsletters, and reports, users have to subscribe 
to its services. No information on the fee charged is provided but interested individuals or 
organizations should contact them for more details on the arrangement of access permissions. 
Automated Power Exchange (APX) 
Homepage: http://www.apx.com/sHome html/sHome.html; Category: Trading 
APX is a private independent company that provides wholesale electricity transaction-processing 
services such as scheduling, settlement, clearing, demand response, generation information, trading 
platforms and brokerages, market infrastructure systems, and consulting. APX does not assist in 
maximizing profits for a utility company but provide timesaving and convenient trading services to its 
customers. In other words, APX acts as the middleman for monitoring and completing completed or 
planned trades. It accepts and make public of schedules submitted for energy, ancillary services, and 
transmissions. APX also assists in utilities settlement by reviewing the activities of trade such as 
changes in ancillary services, imbalance energy, and operator congestion to calculate daily statements 
and monthly invoices. 
Bloomberg 
Homepage: http://www.bloomberg.com/; Category: Trading 
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Bloomberg provides information and services on market data, financial news, and electronic trading. 
Market data covers recent updates on stocks, rates, bonds, currencies, funds, and commodities. In 
stocks, security prices are presented by categories such as world or regional indices, futures, and 
earnings. The rates and bonds include LIBOR rates, mortgage rates, US treasuries, and municipal 
bonds. It also has a list of current benchmark currency and world currency rates. Energy prices such 
as prices on petroleum, natural gas, and electricity are included under commodities. News and 
commentaries on commodities and energy are provided under the markets category. A service known 
as the Bloomberg Professional helps businesses to make accurate and consistent business decisions 
with its real-time analytic ability that can monitor risk and evaluate long-term or short-term 
performance using pricing models. This service also includes three other features: Tradebook, Order 
Management Systems, and Data License. These 3 features provide access to financial databases, risk 
management support, and connect clients to electronic trading. 
Department of Energy (DOE) 
Homepage: http://www.energy.gov; Category: Public 
An organization that aims to provide information for safe, reliable and efficient energy production, 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has four principal program lines. One of them is the energy 
program that aspires to increase domestic energy production, revolutionize the existing approach to 
energy conservation and efficiency as well as promoting the development of renewable and 
alternative energy sources. Vast educational and statistical information are provided through this 
website. Information is available for biomass, coal, geothermal, hydrogen, natural gas, petroleum, 
wind, electricity, hydropower, nuclear energy and solar. However, the data provided are obtained 
from other sources or governmental departments such as: 
Biomass: The Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), Office of Transportation 
Technologies (OTT), Renewable Resource Data Center (RReDC), Bioenergy Information Network, 
Alternative Fuels Data Center (AFDC), and Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE). 
Coal: Fossil Energy (FE), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), and Energy Information 
Administration (EIA). 
Geothermal: Berkeley Lab Earth Sciences Division, National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), 
LANL, and OSTI. 
Hydrogen: FE, LANL, EERE, NREL, and OSTI. 
Natural gas: FE, EERE, BIA, and OTT. 
Petroleum: FE and BIA. 
Wind: NREL, EERE, and OSTI. 
Electricity: BIA, FE, EERE, and OSTI. 
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Hydropower: Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), EERE, Southeastern Power Administration 
(SEPA), Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA), Western Area Power Administration 
(W APA), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). 
Nuclear energy: Office of Nuclear and Science Technology, International Nuclear Safety Center 
(INSC), Nuclear Energy Plant Optimization (NEPO), Nuclear Energy Research Institute (NERI), 
BIA, and Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM). 
Solar: EERE, NREL, and OSTI. 
The information and data available for each category cover statistical data and prices, sources and 
production, research and development, company profiles, forecasts data, existing technologies, 
profiles of power/nuclear plants, supply and demand, and related environmental issues. 
Economy.com, Inc. 
Homepage: http://www.economy.com; Category: Pay-For 
An employee-owned corporation, Economy.com, Inc. is an independent provider of economic, 
financial, country, and industry research data and services. The products provided come in two forms: 
research services and consulting services. Research services cover areas such as consumers, counties, 
countries, credit risk, data, industries, macro, metro areas, and states. On the other hand, the 
consulting services include categories namely client presentations, consumer credit analysis, 
economic development analysis, market analysis, and product line forecasting. Related reports and 
data by industry can be found by the following categories: 
Electric utilities: Comes in single report (US200.00) or by subscription (USS00.00), this Precis 
industry report contains current and anticipated trends, upside and downside risk factors, and forecast 
detail of the economic conditions of the electric utilities. 
Energy: Contains reports on coal forecast, long-term outlook for natural gas supply and demand, 
natural gas prices and forecast. Energy Venture Analysis, Inc provides most of the reports. 
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Edison Electric Institute (EEi) 
Homepage: http://www.eei.org; Category: Membership/Pay-For 
Edison Electric Institute (EEI) is an organization of shareholder-owned electric companies, 
international affiliates, and worldwide industry associates that aims to provide strategic business 
information and expand market opportunities. EEI provides products and services that are free to its 
Electric Company members but requires payment for its associate members and the general public. 
Information available includes FERC filings and statistics, corporate restructuring activities, list of 
electric companies, weekly electric output report, electric utility and financial performance statistics, 
and utility tariffs by state. There are 10 different categories of products offered by the EEI: 
Directories and guides, educational resources and consumer info, energy efficiency, environmental, 
finance and accounting, industry restructuring and regulatory policy, power supply and delivery, 
statistics, The Electrification Council (TEC), and Utility Solid Waste Activities Group (USWAG). 
Information under the statistics category covers reports on installed capacity, average kilowatt-hour 
use, fuel use and type, consumption of fossil fuels, generation and supply, capacity, capability and 
peak load, sources of energy for generation, average delivered cost of fossil fuels, circuit miles of 
overhead transmission lines, sales, revenues and customers, income statements, balance sheets, 
construction expenditures, long-term utility financing, and etc. Other issues pertaining to FERC 
regulatory policies, standards, and utility tariffs can be found under the industry restructuring and 
regulatory policy. 
ElectricNet 
Homepage: http://www.electricnet.com; Category: Pay-For 
A marketplace where information is traded online, ElectricNet sells market research reports, books, 
services, publications, and computer software programs. Under the energy category, there are reports 
on companies, deregulation, electricity, natural gas, coal, nuclear power, alternative sources, solar 
power, pricing and markets, exploration and drilling, retailing, and etc. Each report is listed with its 
publication date and the price. Reports for the electricity subcategory covers data on company 
profiles, financial performance, capital expenditures, customer profiles, supply and demand, 
transmission, generation, and industry structures for countries such as the United States, Spain, 
Ireland, Finland, Italy, Poland, Indonesia, and others. Reports on companies can also be individually 
purchased at a lower price. ElectricNet' s online bookstore offers hardcopy books on electrical power 
82 
distribution and transmission, proceedings of international conference, fundamentals of power 
transmission and distribution flow chart, and rating of electric power cables. 
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 
Homepage: http://www. epri.comldefault. asp; Category: Public/Members hip 
The EPRI offers a wide variety of products, services, and training to its customers. To enjoy full 
benefits of its products and services, EPRI offers membership programs to organizations involved in 
the energy industry throughout the world. The membership programs include collaborative projects, 
application services, technical reports and software programs. The application services support 
engineering and consulting needs and also provide comprehensive market data on energy use and 
consumer attitudes. Provided through what is known as the Destinations 2003/2004, its membership 
programs come in 5 different areas namely power generation, distributed resources, nuclear, 
environment, and power delivery and markets. In the power generation program, EPRI provides 
industry leadership training, solution development as well as tools and services in research areas 
involving fossil steam plants and combustion turbines, market analysis and renewable and 
hydroelectric. As for the membership program in the environment category, EPRI offers strategies 
and tools for asset management and environment protection in research areas pertaining to air quality 
and global climate change, land and groundwater, water and ecosystems, and occupational health and 
safety. On the other hand, EPRI offers solutions in power markets, grid management, transmission 
systems, substations, distribution and power quality, and end-use markets in the power and delivery 
market membership program. 
One of the many projects in EPRI is the Fossil Asset and Project Evaluator (PAPE). This model 
helps analysts to understand the value and financial risk of fossil generation power plants that arises 
from the high volatility in power and fuel market prices. The value of risks calculated includes 
proposed improvements to these plants, the option to retire as well as the option to dispatch. This 
model also includes the physical characteristics of the power plant such as minimum and maximum 
capacity, operation and maintenance costs, taxes, reliability, and a quadratic representation of the heat 
rate curve. It takes into account the future market prices, uncertainty of the future market prices and 
expected correlations of the market prices. In addition to calculating the value of the plant, F APE also 
performs analysis on the sensitivity of the plant to changes in related market prices. The calculations 
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performed help to anticipate the behavior of the power and fuel market that a plant faces in a daily 
basis. 
Enerfax 
Homepage: http://www.enerfax.com; Category: Public/Pay-For 
The Enerfax is a website that contains daily energy prices such as physical gas prices for the 
Gulf/Eastern region, western region, and the Canadian/Rockies region. It is similar to a daily or 
bulletin that advertises current natural gas news and seminars as well as links to purchase products on 
natural gas such as prices of physical natural gas, electricity, oil, and natural gas futures for the entire 
year of 2002. There are also reports on petroleum spot and future prices as well as weekly petroleum 
storage status. Enerfax is an online source for companies that wish to keep up with the current energy 
prices, energy news as well as those that want to purchase historical energy-related data: inventory 
and futures reports. 
Energy Argus, Inc. 
Homepage: http://www.fi,eldston.com/; Category: Public/Pay-For 
Energy Argus provides information on news, prices and developments on air, coal, oil, power, 
transportation, and weather. For the power industry, it offers reports on price assessments, market 
commentary, market news, industry news, analysis in real-time and newsletters. A comprehensive 
database with historical coverage from 2000 on hourly prices is provided. It also reports and analyzes 
market trading via two bulletins: Daily Power Plays and Weekly Power Plays. Weekly Power Plays 
also includes discussions and data on weather derivatives. Types of fuel grades prices are provided 
via Petroleum Argus. Energy Argus publishes current and historical coal prices assessment in the 
COAL Daily and provides international coverage in the COAL Daily International. Recently, an 
exclusive report on Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) projects at coal-fired plants in the eastern US 
is available for purchase that includes information such as the operating company, plant name and 
location, unit size and number, project status, and projected in service date. To plan and understand 
more on the relationship between coal markets, coal transportation, and power production and prices, 
Energy Argus provides a biweekly Coal Transportation Report that has in service for 16 years. For 
coverage on air quality and emissions, AIR Daily reports news, standards, policies, and developments 
on air quality control as well as information on markets for tradable pollutants. Transportation news is 
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provided through newsletters such as Rail Business, Urban Transport Solutions, Intermodal Business, 
and Rail Supplier News. 
Energy Bureau, Iowa Department of Natural Resources 
Homepage: http:/lwww.state.ia.us/govemment/dnr/energy/index.htm; Category: Public 
This Iowa State Energy Bureau offers vast informational energy news, publications, events, and 
programs for Iowans. Its energy programs such as renewable energy programs and industrial energy 
management program aims to increase energy efficiency while meeting all future demands as well as 
to increase the use. of alternative energy resources. There are also publicly available energy reports 
that cover general publications (Iowa Energy Plan for 2000 and 2002, Iowa Energy Policy Task 
Force, Iowa Energy Bulletins, Iowa Energy News, and Iowa Climate Change Report), renewable 
energy publications, building energy management publications, building energy management annual 
reports (1997-2002), and building energy management guidelines. The "Other Resources" link in this 
website provides information and data on Iowa Energy Regulations, Iowa Energy Data, Historical 
Fuel Prices from 1980-2002, Renewable Energy Financial Assistance and Incentives, and Links to 
other energy sites. The data available in each of the previously mentioned resources are as follows: 
Iowa Energy Regulations: life cycle cost analysis of public facilities, energy development and 
conservation, Midwest energy compact, wind energy tax conversion, ethanol sales tax exemption, and 
net billing. 
Iowa Energy Data: general trend, general energy forecasts, general energy and economic trends, 
energy prices, natural gas trends, petroleum trends, coal trends, electricity consumption trends, 
electricity prices, electricity miscellaneous, and renewables. 
Historical Fuel Prices: historical gasoline, propane, and fuel oil prices from 1980-2002. 
Renewable Energy Financial Assistance and Incentives: a list of contacts information on grants and 
loan programs. 
Energy Central 
Homepage: http://www.energycentral.com; Category: Pay-For 
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Energy Central is an online source for daily power and gas news, conferences, shows, research 
reports, and forums for the energy industrial professionals. It also provides a service called the Energy 
Central Professional where subscribers have access to comprehensive information resources such as 
news, industry data, and company profiles. The news section covers information on power and gas 
news, prices, and the stock market. Members can also obtain information on industry data such as 
lists of mergers and acquisitions, power plants, nuclear data, power marketing data, load growth, 
deregulation status, and legislation. Company profiles include data on investor-owned utilities 
(IOUs), merchant power producers, cooperatives, municipal, and state/federal plants. 
Individual reports can be purchased individually. Examples of such reports are asset sales and 
acquisitions of US Investor-Owned Utilities 2003 and A Review of US Electricity Markets in 2001 
(Volatility Analysis and Price Database). These reports come in white paper or premium format and 
are categorized by the following categories: acquisitions, alternative energy, business management, 
California crisis, coal, cogeneration, company information, competition & deregulation, construction, 
distributed generation, distribution, efficiency/conservation, energy management, energy policy, 
engineering, environmental, financial, fuel, gas, human resources, industry structure, legal, 
legislation/regulatory, load shapes, marketing, mergers, acquisitions &divestitures, new technologies, 
oil, operation, people, planning, plant operations, power marketing, pricing, public power, rates, 
renewable energy, sales, technology, telecommunications, transactions & agreements, transmission, 
utility billing, utility business, utility e-commerce, water, and weather. 
The online databases can be accessed through its data center where instant reports can be obtained. 
They can be accessed when purchased on an individual or corporate subscription bases. The types of 
available reports are plant operation statistics database, FERC Form 1 online database 2003 edition, 
utilities financial database, and deregulation legislation database. 
There are also directories of associations, state public utility commissions, vendor centers, and 
electric power trade publications. The publications are sorted by its type (newsletter, journal, or 
magazine), publication's name, frequency (daily, weekly, monthly, or quarterly), and the publisher's 
name. 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
Homepage: http://www.eia.doe.gov/; Category: Public 
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EIA is one of the most comprehensive sources for public energy information. This source contains 
current and historical information (as early as 1949) on specific industries such as coal, electricity, 
natural gas, nuclear, petroleum, solar, and renewable energy. Information is divided into 4 different 
groups: energy data, analyses, forecasts and descriptions of the available information. Energy data is 
gathered from trade associations, government agencies and may be in the form of feedbacks from 
statistical surveys on energy producers, users, transporters and other businesses. Analysis data 
includes technical reports and articles that analyze related energy issues such as economics, 
technology, energy production, prices, distribution, storage, consumption and environmental effects. 
Forecasts data includes the forecast models, short-term forecasts (6-8 quarters) and long-term 
forecasts (up to 20 years) that cover energy supply, consumption, prices, and other significant factors. 
EIA also provides a description of their products to allow easy maneuver of required information. It 
has a complete list of energy data contacts, directories of survey forms, lists of publications, 
electronic products and models as well as energy education resources guide. 
Energy Info Source, Inc. 
Homepage: http://www.energyinfosource.com/; Category: Pay-For 
Energy Info Source offers news and products for the energy industry. News, information and data 
cover areas such as distributed generation, generation, transmission, retail marketing, wholesale 
marketing, finance/restructuring, and gas. In addition, it also provides the energy industry 
information such as conferences, request for proposal (RFP) database, FERC documents, and market 
prices from PJM, ISO New England, and NYISO as well as a list of other vendors that offers products 
and services for the energy market participants. It also sells newsletters and reports on issues 
pertaining to deregulation, distributed generation, e-commerce, generation, green power, mergers and 
acquisitions, nuclear power, retail marketing, and transmission. Rapid reports are also sold where 
latest information on the electric industry is updated every time the reports are being accessed. 
Energy Online 
Homepage: http://www.energyonline.com; Category: Public/Pay-For 
A registered trademark of LCG Consulting, Energy Online provides news, consulting services, and 
forecasting tools to the energy industry. It also provides a forum for discussion and exchange of ideas 
in the industry, software products and databases for utility analysis and forecasting as well as 
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workshops. Reports available cover information on competition, deregulation and forecasting, market 
simulation, asset valuation and performance, regional transmission organizations (RTOs), 
transmission and tariff design, and mergers and acquisitions. More specifically, the following reports 
are accessible from each category: 
Competition, deregulation and forecasting: Market design study for California, analysis of energy and 
ancillary services in all the major hubs in the U.S., natural gas and electricity price forecast with 
volatility analysis, comprehensive report about U.S. Electricity Markets in 1998 with risk analysis 
and pricing database, competitive market analysis and asset evaluation reports for the NERC region, 
and more. 
Market simulation, asset valuation and performance: market-based valuation of new coal-fired 
generation, revenue from ancillary services and the value of operational flexibility, real option 
valuation of coal generation and coal research and development in the U.S., the contribution of 
energy and ancillary services to net income of generating units in the U.S. power system, and more. 
Regional Transmission Organizations, transmission and tariff design: transmission capacity and 
market contestability in the Midwest interconnect generation and transmission investments in the 
restructured electricity market, analysis and design of RTO operations, market benefits and asset 
valuation, and more. 
Mergers and acquisitions: the potential exercise of market power by the proposed merger of two 
utilities in the Midwest interconnect, an analysis of generation market power in the Midwest 
interconnect, and more. 
The public database includes data on coal prices, natural gas prices and forecast. The pay-for database 
. known as the PLATO, contains data for electric Plants, Loads, stranded Assets, Transmission, and 
Operations for all utilities and Independent Power Producers in the U.S. Data can be retrieved by 
organization, region, area, state or council. This company has developed a system called UPLAN 
Network Power Model (UPLAN-NPM) to simulate the operation of the electric power markets that 
also maintains and updates a large-scale database of generating and transmission facilities, historical 
hub price indices, load and fuel price forecasts for all NERC regions. Some of its functional 
components include day-ahead market model, real-time chronological dispatch, volatility model, 
maintenance scheduling model, hydro scheduling model, and merchant plant model. Another product 
is the UPLAN-G that is a planning and management system for the gas model which features such as 
system operations and resource optimization for gas supply, and analysis of market demand, rates, 
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revenue and finances. This works hand in hand with UTRACK, which is a daily tracking and 
management system for data on companies, contracts, transactions and, reports for the gas model. 
Energy Venture Analysis, Inc. 
Homepage: http://www.evainc.com/; Category: Pay-For/Service 
Energy Venture Analysis, Inc. or EV A is a company that provides services such as project analysis, 
financial evaluations, long-term pricing, and market forecasting for existing and proposed power 
plants, coal mines, coal companies, natural gas storage projects, and other energy projects. The 
energy models that EV A uses include power generation forecasting model and environmental 
compliance model. The former model projects electricity prices and allocates regional generation by 
fuel type with its forecasting techniques based on assumptions on economic growth, fuel prices, and 
environment limitations. A unit-specific model, the latter model analyzes the incremental costs of 
removing NOx and S02. Some of the databases that EV A utilizes are databases on power supplier, 
coal mine, environment emissions, and electricity prices. The information in each databases are as 
follows: 
Power supplier database: production cost, generation, fuel consumption, delivered fuel prices, and 
fuel quality from 1985-present. 
Coal mine database: ownership, production productivity, and production cost. 
Environment emissions database: power supplier emission allocations and announced compliance 
plan. 
Electricity prices: daily and forecasted regional electricity prices during both on and off-peak periods. 
There are 3 forecasting services in EV A: FUELCAST, COALCAST, and eCAST. FUELCAST 
analyzes short and long term supply, demand, and price trends for the four fossil fuels whereas 
COALCAST analyzes similar data on coal. No information can be found on eCAST. EVA also offers 
consulting services in the following areas: electricity, natural gas, oil, coal, environmental analysis, 
and energy audits. In addition to that, EV A makes some of their research available through 
Economy .com. 
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Enermetrix 
Homepage: http://www.enermetrix.com/; Category: Service!frading 
A subsidiary of CES International (provider of real-time software solutions for distribution utilities), 
Enermetrix provides an electronic marketplace for retail natural gas and electricity as well as services 
that manages risks and production for buyers and sellers in the energy industry. The electronic 
marketplace known as the Enermetrix Network offers a real-time and automated transaction-
processing environment for buyers and sellers to execute low cost and risk energy contracts. 
Enermetrix Network comprises of two databases known as the BuyerMetrix database and the 
SellerMetrix database. Energy Service Companies and businesses that buy and consume energy users 
the BuyerMetrix database to obtain information about the physical facility locations and details about 
natural gas and electricity accounts. Information includes historical energy consumption, historical 
energy costs, how the costs break down by local utility and third party supplier, terms and conditions 
of energy contracts, credit information about the accounts and counter parties, local utility contacts, 
rates, tariffs, delivery points for energy as well as the pipelines and transmission lines for those points 
of delivery. The SellerMetrix database automates pricing and contracting processing that also 
contains details on information similar to BuyerMetrix (historical data, rates, tariffs, etc.). Both 
databases allow customizable web interfaces, comparisons and analyses on load shape pattern, real-
time and secure trading, and competitive bidding environment with secure use of digital signatures. 
The Energy Operating System (EOS Solutions) contains products that include the BuyerMetrix and 
SellerMetrix as well as POLRMetrix and ProServices. POLRMetrix is tailored for regulated utilities 
with provider of last resort obligations where ProServices offers business strategies and 
benchmarking services against successful businesses in the market through developing a customized 
software program for its customers. 
Environment Protection Agency (EPA) 
Homepage: http://www.epa.gov/; Category: Public 
This website contains a comprehensive source of data on the environmental characteristics of 
virtually most electric power plants in the United States. With the integration of 24 different federal 
data sources, the Emissions & Generation Resource Integrated Database (eGRID) provides data on air 
emissions and resource mix for individual power plants, generating companies, states and regions of 
the power grid. A detailed emissions profile covering nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, carbon dioxide 
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and mercury is reported in tons/pound, input rate and output rate. Other reports on changes in 
ownership, changes in industry structure, corporate affiliation, locational information and the power 
flow between states and grid regions are also included in this database. EGRID also includes data on 
net imports/exports by state and power interchange between grid regions. Data is collected from 1996 
through 2000. Other data includes reports on the status of air quality and air emissions, greenhouse 
gas emissions and sinks. 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
Homepage: http://www.ferc.gov/; Category: Public 
FERC offers a records information system, Federal Energy Regulatory Records Information System 
(FERRIS) that contains more than 21 years of historical documents submitted to and issued by FERC. 
The latest release of version 2.0 includes electronic versions of documents issued by FERC 1989-
present and other non-electronic documents on electric, hydropower, gas and oil. Types of 
information offered via FERC relating to industries such as electric, hydropower, gas and oil are: 
• Companies websites and industry-related associations 
• Interest and discount rates 
• Pipeline listings 
• Reports on electric utilities, cost and quality of fuels, transmission planning and evaluation 
• Tariffs and environmental data 
• Standard market design activities 
• Policy and guidance information 
Financial Engineering Associates, Inc. (FEA) 
Homepage: http://www.fea.com; Category: Service 
FEA offers products for the development of option valuation models and market risk assessment 
software. Its products are divided into three different industries namely energy analytics, risk 
management, and financial analytics. All the products available in these 3 different areas are: 
@Energy/Basics and Advanced- energy and power options 
@Energy/Forward - forward curve builder 
@Energy/Load Serve - values a wide variety of load dependent power purchase obligations 
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@Energy/Power Generation - values a wide variety of fossil fuel power generation assets and tolling 
contracts 
@Energy/Storage- pricing, hedging, and risk management for storage contracts and facilities 
@Energy/Swing - power and natural gas swing contracts 
@Energy/Weather- weather derivatives 
@Equity - equity options 
@Global - pricing, hedging, and risk management for currency and agricultural commodity markets 
@Interest-pricing, hedging, and risk management for interest rate markets 
DerivaTool- generalized Monte Carlo Simulation 
MakeVC- volatility and correlation data sets 
VaRWorks- Value-at-Risk 
Gas Technology Institute (GTI) 
Homepage: http://www.gastechnology.org/; Category: Service 
GTI is a research, development and training organization that serves energy market. It develops 
solutions for consumers, industry and government in terms of the use of natural gas: find, produce, 
move and store. Products and services come in the form of contract research, development and 
demonstration projects, technical services in areas related to energy and environment, plans and 
manage technology development programs, and education and training on business and energy related 
topics. Planning and management covers 4 different aspects of natural gas: supply, pipeline integrity, 
distribution and construction operations, and gas-use efficiency and environmental issues. 
Contract research is divided into sustaining membership program (SMP), collaborative programs, 
collaborative projects, custom projects and other major new research contracts. SMP strives to 
develop new and innovative technology concepts that builds and protects natural gas markets while 
reducing the cost of transmissions. Areas that are covered in this program: gas operations, 
environmental science and technology, energy utilization, distributed energy resources and advanced 
energy systems. Some of the SMP participants include MidAmerican Energy Co., Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co. and Minnegasco (Reliant Energy). Collaborative programs cover a broader technology 
with a market for a group of investors whereas collaborative projects just focus on a single and 
deliverable project for a group of investors. Custom projects are tailored for a single investor and new 
research contracts are those recently awarded contracts to GTI. 
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Haver Analytics 
Homepage: http://www.haver.com; Category: Pay-For 
This company produces databases and software products for economic analysis and business-decision 
making. All products and services are only available to Raver's clients. There are over 100 databases 
available for purchase to its clients. The industry databases include the following energy related data 
(data obtained from sources such as Oil and Gas Journal and Edison Electric Institute (EEI)): 
U.S. and international energy statistics: Cover data on imports and exports, natural gas, prices, 
demand, consumption, production, reserves, explorations, and refining. Data on U.S available by state 
and region include coal, nuclear energy, renewable resources and electricity generation, consumption 
and sales. 
Weekly oil statistics: Cover data on production, consumption, refining, imports and exports, stocks, 
and prices. Data on U.S. are available by state and region. 
U.S. electric output: Cover data on weekly electric utility output for the total U.S. and by 9 regions 
from EEi. 
These data can be accessed via Haver Analytics online database retrieval service known as the 
HaverSelect. For better data management, it provides software called Data Link Express (DLX) that 
enables fast updating services for latest and modified data, easy-to-view data in graphical forms, and 
a utility service that converts data to be used in many different database managers and econometric 
packages. 
Independent Petroleum Association of American (IPAA) 
Homepage: http://www.ipaa.org; Category: Public 
IP AA provides statistics, forecasts and trends on industries such as crude oil, natural gas, and 
petroleum. Economic reports covering long-run and short-run supply and demand forecasts, domestic 
oil and gas trends, and current state of the industry, natural gas storage, facts and surveys are also 
available through the research and information menu. There are information on crude oil and natural 
gas; weekly averages of posted prices, monthly information on production and total imports/exports, 
consumptions and storage activities. There is a single publication that contains 20 years of data on 
petroleum pertaining to exploration, drilling, reserves, supply, demand, prices, costs, industry 
employment and financial indicator. Fact sheets cover explanations on various energy policy issues. 
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Intercontinental Exchange 
Homepage: http://www.intercontinentalexchange.com/home.html; Category: Trading 
Known to provide electronic trading platform for energy and metals commodities the markets of 
physical natural gas, financial natural gas, physical power, financial power, and financial oil and 
refined products, Intercontinental Exchange offers the lOx Group that offers historical and real-time 
market data. Real-time access to over-the-counter prices and futures prices is provided through its 
WeblCE's service. Through its lOx Report, Intercontinental Exchange also publishes reports on 
North American power and gas: news, statistics, summaries and commentaries. Subscribers have 
access to full market activity on power and natural gas prices and their forward price curves. 
Investment Science 
Homepage: http://www. investmentscience. com; Category: Public 
A place for discussions and ideas, Investment Science presents various modem investment analysis, 
ideas, and techniques on the pricing and management of real assets. It publishes high quality 
conceptual and technical articles on investment analysis. Examples of the published articles are: 
• Real Options Primer Portfolion 
• Pricing and R&D Venture with Uncertain Time to Innovation 
• Structured Approach to R&D Valuation - Using Investment Science to Analyze New Ideas 
• Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Mean Reverting Process 
• Discounting a Mean Reverting Cash Flow 
• Using Simulation to Calculate the NPV of a Project 
The last 3 are referred to as the how to' s according to Investment Science because they offer practical 
case studies and tutorials instead of just concepts and ideas. This company also offers useful real 
options resources in the following categories: 
Books: a list of selections in Finance, economics, real options, corporate finance, strategy, modeling, 
and optimization. 
Consulting: A firm known as Onward Inc., that offers mathematical modeling for business solutions. 
Software: Real Options Calculator, an Excel Add-In, that solves decisions involving real options by 
Onward Inc., and LatticeMaker that can build binomial lattices in Excel. 
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Training: Short courses on modem concepts for real options, project options, business model options, 
and accelerated financial growth from Stanford University. 
ISIS International, Inc. 
Homepage: http://www.isisusa.com/; Category: Service 
ISIS International, Inc. provides market assessment and develops business strategies for a wide range 
of clients in different industries. Its market assessment systems include: 
• Opportunity finder - to identify new business opportunity areas 
• Precision assessment - highly focused market assessment of single technology 
• Market choice - high level market prioritization of multiple complementary technologies 
The innovation systems contain models such as: Precision innovation I, II, III and IV - creation on 
new products based on existing technology (I), next generation and new products (II), next generation 
and new products with innovation enhancement (III), and breakthrough product innovation (IV) 
The technology assessment systems include the following: 
• Precision solution - Identifies commercially available technology needed to solve a specific 
problem (rapid solution process) 
• Expanded precision solution - Discovers alternative or new technology for new products 
• Breakthrough solution is to identify innovative technologies for new products. 
• Key supplier solutions - Aligns supplier technology development with the needs of 
customers 
• The speed-based commercialization systems have models such as: 
• Precision market entry - Develops and launches new product into one market 
• Multi-market entry-Develops and launches new product into multiple markets 
• New business builder - Characterize products for emerging needs and discontinuities 
• Launch strategizer - Developments market tactics and communication vehicles to launch new 
products. 
Other systems are the licensing and alliance development systems: Precision licensing and partner, 
and Expanded licensing and partnering, and the sales enhancement systems: Key-customers sales 
enhancement, and Course correction. In general, ISIS provides a vast variety of services such as long 
range planning, technical breakthroughs, marketing strategies, commercial assessment of market 
potential, market validation of technologies, concepts, research and development portfolio 
prioritization. 
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National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) - National Environmental 
Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS) 
Homepage: http://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/; Category: Public/Pay-For 
NOAA offers a service known as the NESDIS that provides data on global environment from 
satellites and conducts related research. Some of the information that may be useful to the energy 
industry comes from the national climatic data center at this link: 
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/ncdc.html. Products come in the forms of publications, CD-ROMS, and 
downloadable files. The following are examples of available products that can be purchased: 
• Local climatological data from July 1996 - latest. 
• U.S. Climate Normals from 1971-2000. 
• Surface Weather Observations from July 1996- latest. 
• Storm data from 1994 - latest. 
• Annual Climatological Summary from 1948 - latest. 
• Hourly precipitation data from 1997 - latest. 
Some examples of freely available reports are: 
• Extreme Weather and Climate Events - date range varies 
• U.S. Storm Events Database from 1993-latest. 
• Climatic Wind Data for the U.S. from 1930- 1996. 
• Comparative climatic data for over 250 U.S. cities. 
• Heating and cooling degree-day, temperature, and precipitation data from 1931 - latest. 
Covers up-to-date heating and cooling fuel demand information on a statewide basis. 
• U.S. Historical Climatology Network from 1900- 1995. 
• Freeze/Frost Data from 1951- 1980. 
Most data are available online for free and a minimum fee if there is a need to purchase the hardcopy. 
Some data are available through annual or monthly subscriptions. 
Newton-Evans Research Company, Inc. 
Homepage: http://www.newton-evans.com/; Category: Service 
This company provides marketing management support services to the electric, gas, water utilities 
and their suppliers. The types of support services provided includes market research, strategic 
planning, management briefings, competitive analysis, business plan development, market 
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opportunity analysis, market sizing and forecasting, customer attitude research programs, product 
planning, marketing communications, price detennination, and marketing program planning. The 
primary business of this company is to provide client-exclusive marketing research. An example of a 
marketing research report is based on a utility perspective on distributed generation where it covers 
the impact and issues of the implementation of distributed generation in the electric utility industry. 
This report can be purchased in 3 volumes series with five year outlooks: North American study, 40 
Nation International Study, and Supplier Profiles. Other reports are the study of supervisory control 
and data acquisition (SCADA), energy management systems (EMS) and distribution management 
system (DMS) in electric utilities and in the gas and oil pipeline operations. Besides reports, Newton-
Evans also offers onsite briefings and professional research analysts' service through teleconference 
consulting that is available either on a contract or an ad-hoc basis. 
New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) 
Homepage: http://www.nymex.com/jsp/index.jsp; Category: Trading 
The NYMEX is a trading place for both energy and metal commodities. This source contains 
information on daily and historical prices quotes and provides descriptions and specifications on types 
of contracts namely futures, options, calendar spread options, e-miNY energy futures, and NYMEX 
clearport. The energy market trades commodities such as light, sweet crude oil, natural gas, heating 
oil, unleaded gasoline, Brent crude oil, propane, and coal. Metal commodities traded are gold, silver, 
copper, aluminum, platinum, and palladium. 
Northern Electricity Reliability Council (NERC) 
Homepage: http://www.nerc.com/; Category: Public/Payjor/Membership 
NERC provides a database and software program on electricity supply and demand, ES&D that 
includes historical actual and forecasted data on electricity. Public information consists of actual and 
forecasted current and historical capacity and demand from 2002 data set. Other information such as a 
more detailed utility-level data is available through the purchase of this software. This information 
ranges from capacity purchases and sales, transmission lines additions, existing generating units and 
planned generation units and changes based on 2002 data set. Forecast regional and sub-regional data 
includes annual and monthly electricity demand, net energy for load, capacity resources and demand, 
generating capacity by fuel and existing transmission lines. This data originates from 2002 data set 
97 
with 2002-2011 forecasts based on 2001 actual data. It also contains ten-year projection (1990-2001) 
and monthly data sets from 1997-2001. 
Pricing information: 
• Regular information - $149.00 
• Regional council members - Free 
• Government agencies - Free 
Generating availability reports beginning from 1982 through the most current year are freely available 
through the Generating Availability Database (GADs) at http://www.nerc.com/-gads/. This database 
contains information on the performance of electric generating equipments. Another personal 
computer version known as the pc-GAR enables users to evaluate generator equipment performance 
on generating units, equipment units, and major components. This pc-
GAR is priced at $750 for GADS-contributing NERC Regional Council members and $2000 non-
members. An application tool, Manufacturer's Support Services (MSS) provides variety of data from 
GADs into 4 types: annual unit data, quarterly unit data, major equipment group data and individual 
component cause code data. This CD-ROM provides design data on installed equipment and design 
parameters of a generating unit as well as event data that contain detailed description on 
incidents/factors affecting the availability of a generating unit. There is no price information on this 
CD-ROM, except to contact the manager of GADs services. 
Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ) 
Homepage: http://orc.pennnet.com/home.cfm; Category: Public/Pay-For 
The Oil and Gas Journal online research center has vast information on surveys, statistical data, 
studies and databases on the energy industry. The OGJ energy database is offered in conjunction with 
Haver Analytics. The fee for downloading data is $15/series for monthly, quarterly, or annual series 
(OGJANN) and $25/series for weekly series (OILWKLY). The OGJ energy database contains the 
following data: 
• Drilling and exploration: well completions, and rig counts. 
• Production: crude oil production, oil and gas well abandonment, producing oil wells, and 
OPEC production quotas. 
• Reserves: crude oil, natural gas, and stripper well. 
• Refining: refinery supply and output of products. 
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• Imports and exports: crude oil and refined products. 
• Stocks: crude oil stocks and stocks of petroleum. 
• Demand/consumption: demand for petroleum products, motor oil sales, oil consumption, 
demand, and supply. 
• Natural gas: production, sales to pipelines, processing, imports, and exports. 
• Prices: crude oil, natural gas, gasoline, residual fuel oil, and jet fuel. 
Financial and investment: capital expenditures by industry segment, reinvestment ratio, capitalized 
and expensed cost by type, severance and production taxes, total and primary energy expenditures by 
sector. 
Transportation: total mileage of US interstate pipelines, pipeline construction costs, crude and 
products transported by pipeline. 
Offshore: offshore production of crude and natural gas, drilling activity, leasing sale, federal offshore 
leasing, and platforms in federal water. 
Other energy: production of energy by type, consumption of energy by type, electric power 
generation by source, supply and disposition of electricity, sales of electricity by end use sector, 
electricity sales and electricity losses, fuels consumed by electric utilities, nuclear based electricity 
generation. 
Miscellaneous: petroleum industry employment, total petroleum industry, oil and gas extraction, 
petroleum refining, pipeline, gas distribution, petroleum products wholesale, and retail gasoline. 
Other products available for purchased covers the following aspects of the energy industry: 
• OGJ surveys, studies, and guides: current and historical data on gas, refinery, and oil. 
• OGJ executive reports: analysis on oil and gas industry operations and activities that provides 
statistical management tools for risk analysis and negotiation. 
• Industry research reports: Summary and analysis of rig shipments developed by industry 
experts. 
• OGJ energy database statistical reports: as mentioned earlier in the OGJ energy database. 
Onward Inc. 
Homepage: http://www.onward-net.com/; Category: Service 
This is an operations management-consulting firm that develops analytical and mathematical tools for 
business solutions. Onward has expertise on mathematical modeling, software development as well as 
99 
application consulting. The mathematical models are built using various techniques such as linear and 
non-linear programming, statistical forecasting, quality control, constraint-based optimization, 
applied differential equations, and numerical methods for analysis, simulation, and queuing theory 
around the following business problems: 
• Optimal pricing and bundling for product sales 
• Efficient design for call routing logic for large call centers 
• Load forecasts for technical support calls generated by software licenses 
• Valuation of contract structures for decision support during negotiations 
It recently developed and Excel Add-in for real options known as the Real Options Calculator (ROC). 
This beta software helps to model real options decisions based on 4 types of uncertainty handling 
methods namely Geometric Brownian Motion, Ornstein-Uhlenbeck mean reversion, exponential 
mean reversion, and normal random variable. 
Open Systems International, Inc. 
Homepage: http://osii.com/home.html; Category: Service 
OSI Incorporated offers utility companies automated solutions such as Energy Management Systems 
(EMS), Distribution Management Systems (DMS), Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
Systems (SCADA), and Generation Management Systems (GMS). Some of its North American 
customers include Alliant Energy (West Iowa), Automated Power Exchange (California), Kentucky 
Utilities Company, and Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company. 
EMS comprises of 7 products namely OpenNet (Transmission and Network Security Analysis), 
OpenOTS (Operator Training Simulator), OpenCIM (Common Information Model Interface), 
OpenA VC (Automatic VoltageN AR Control), OpenEOS (Equipment Outage Scheduling), 
OpenSTLF (Short-Term Load Forecast), and OpenTMS (Transaction Management System). OpenNet 
performs online security analysis, operations planning, and offline engineering studies. Its 
functionality features include network topology processor, contingency analysis, contingency 
screening, state estimator, external network estimator, optimal power flow, security dispatch, voltage 
or VAR dispatch, power flow, short circuit analysis, loss penalty factor calculation, and available 
transfer capability. OpenOTS offers training on simulated real-time system responses to events that 
allow operators to practice their responses to such events. OpenCIM provides common format for 
data transfers between different platforms and applications. OpenA VC implements the strategies for 
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voltage and VAR dispatch. OpenEOS schedules outages for generators, transmission lines, 
transformers, breakers and switches, loads and reactive compensation devices. OpenSTLF conducts 
hourly load forecasts based on simple pattern matching techniques to correlate multiple input 
variables such as forecasted weather conditions and historical facts on load and weather. OpenTMS is 
just a graphical user interface that is developed to help simultaneous convenient viewings of 
information. DMS and GMS have similar products to EMS. 
SCADA contains 6 different products: OpenSCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition), 
OpenFEP (Communications Front End Processing), OpenHIS (Historical Information System and 
Data Archiving), OpenAccess (Gateway and Communications Products), OpenICCP (Inter-Control 
Center Communication Protocol), and OpenHRS (Historical Recording System). OpenSCADA 
provides efficient real-time information management and support for the power grid. OpenFEP 
handles communications across different devices. OpenHIS stores real-time and calculated data in a 
commercial relational database management system. OpenAccess provides high-speed 
communication access between EMS/SCADA host and local area network. OpenICCP offers 
communications between Independent System Operator, power plant, and the system transmission 
operator. OpenHIS records and manages large-scale data collection and data archiving. 
Penn Energy 
Homepage: http://pennenergydata.com; Category: Pay-For 
Penn Energy provides well data, production data, drilling permits and activities data. Well data 
includes data on 3.5 million wells with many dating back to the 1800s that is presented by the well 
name, well number, operator, location data, field, latitude, longitude, dates, and depths. The 
production data covers detailed oil and gas production information. The most updated data on new 
drilling permits such as the operator and related contact information are provided as well. There are 3 
different types of subscriptions available: national corporate, regional corporate, and regional 
individual. 
Penn Well 
Homepage: http://store.yahoo.com/pennwell/electricpower.html; Category: Pay-For 
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Penn Well has an online store that sells books, videos, CD-ROMS, and E-books. The books available 
for purchase are categorized as follows: 
Deregulation and restructuring: A Practical Guide to Gas Contracting, The California Energy Crisis, 
Creating Competitive Power Markets: The PJM Model. 
Electricity and gas purchasing: Electricity Purchasing Handbook, ESCO: The Energy Services 
Company Handbook, Natural Gas Purchasing Handbook, Utility Negotiating Strategies for End-
Users. 
Environmental and safety: Emergency Exercise Handbook, Evaluate and Integrate your Company's 
Plan, A non-technical guide to energy resources: availability, use, and impact, Power Plant 
Permitting, Utility Security: The New Paradigm. 
Marketing, trading and risk: Analyzing and Managing Risky Investments, Effective Power 
Marketing, Energy Futures: Trading Opportunities, Energy Marketing Handbook, Fundamentals of 
Trading Energy Futures & Options, Gas Trading Manual. 
Machinery: Filtration: Principles and Practices, An Introduction to Machinery Analysis and 
Monitoring. 
Non-technical series: Distributed Generation, Electric Power Distribution Systems, Electric Power 
Industry, Managing Energy Risk, Merchant Power. 
Power generation: Applied Reliability-Centered Maintenance, Basics of Electric Motors, 
Cogeneration and Wheeling of Electric Power: Opportunities in a Changing Market. 
Transmission and distribution: A Guide to Utility Automation, Basics of Electric Power 
Transmission, Electrical Distribution Engineering, Guide to Electric Load Management, Management 
of Transmission and Distribution Systems, Retail Wheeling. 
Energy industry links: Links to sites such as the Electric Light and Power, Power Engineering, and 
International Association for Energy Economics. 
Books from OGJ Energy database that can be purchased are: 
• Energy Statistics Sourcebook, 14th Edition ($50.00) 
• Enhanced Oil Recovery Survey in Excel Format ($300.00) 
• International Energy Statistics Sourcebook, 9th Edition ($50.00) 
• International Ehtylene Survey in Excel Format ($350.00) 
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• Natural Gas Statistics Sourcebook, 7lh Edition ($50.00) 
• Pricing Statistics Sourcebook, 61h Edition ($50.00) 
• Refining Statistics Sourcebook, 61h Edition ($50.00) 
• US Gas and Oil Company Performance Report, 3r<1 Edition ($50.00) 
• US Pipeline Study in Excel Format ($545.00) 
• Worldwide Construction Projects in Excel Format 
• Worldwide Gas Processing Survey in Excel Format ($395.00) 
• Worldwide Oil Fuel Survey in Excel Format ($495.00) 
• Worldwide Refinery Survey in Excel Format ($795.00) 
• World wide Refinery Survey & Complexity Analysis in Excel Format ($995.00) 
Platts Energy 
Homepage: http://www.platts.com; Category: PublidPay-For 
Platts Energy provides information, news, and market data on oil, natural gas, coal, electric power, 
nuclear, petro-chemicals, business and technology, engineering, risk management, and research and 
consulting services. Utility fuel prices are available for free to the public. The primary data bank of 
the Platts Energy is offered through its Utility Data Institute (UDI). The North American Energy Data 
has information on: 
North American Energy Business Directory provided by SageWage ($3775 - annual subscription): 
Data on business statistics such as customers, sales and revenues as well as financial data and contact 
information on 225 investor-owned utilities, major cooperatives, and government utilities. 
2003 Platts Directory of Electric Power Producers and Distributors ($425): Includes data on 3300 
electric utilities (investor-owned, municipal, rural electric cooperatives, public power districts, 
irrigation districts, and government-owned) - financial data, contact information, power purchases 
and sales, generating capacities, transmission, and distribution. 
1981-2000 Production Costs: Operating Steam-Electric Plants ($995) 
1986-2000 Production Costs: Gas Turbine and Combined-Cycle Plants ($995) 
Platts also provides world energy data and other database services for the electric utilities such as 
BaseCase, NewGEN, Platts European POWER vision, and POWERdat. 
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Silicon Energy 
Homepage: http://siliconenergy.com/; Category: Service 
Silicon Energy provides Enterprise Energy Management Suite for use of commercial, industry, oil 
and gas, and utility companies. For utility companies, it helps to offer demand management strategies, 
exchange data with trading and settlement systems, real-time management tools to lower costs and 
improve revenue and margin growths. Its supply and demand management schemes include peak load 
management, distributed energy management, and procurement management. The peak load 
management enables real-time energy consumption monitoring and to forecast consumption 
requirements as well as generating alerts for exceeded thresholds situation. Distributed energy 
management scheme attempts to understand current energy demands and respond to volatile energy 
pricing to optimally distribute electricity generation. Procurement management uses and evaluates 
historical data to estimate future energy needs and tailors for long-term energy contracts. Other 
services provided are bill analysis, capital assessment, and facilities management. Some of its 
customers include Consolidated Edison Company (New York), DTE Energy Technologies, and 
Planergy. 
The Power Marketing Association Online 
Homepage: http://www.powermarketers.com/; Category: Pay-For/Membership 
An online resource for information, the Power Marketing Association Online provides news, training, 
staffing assistance, consulting services and research data to the power industry. It provides publicly 
available electricity and natural gas prices (futures and spot) as well as weather data. Its energy 
library includes articles, reports, training and online bookstore featuring proceedings on conferences 
related to power management, transmission, green and renewable, engineering, natural gas, finance, 
credit, retail, power generation, and wholesale markets. The industry directories contain energy links, 
directory of power marketers as well as the energy white and yellow pages. 
The Structure Group 
Homepage: http://www.thestructuregroup.com/structureldefault.asp; Category: Service 
The Structure Group is a consulting and software company that provides business solutions for the 
deregulated energy industry in Europe and North America. Its North American software products 
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have features to handle bidding, scheduling, dispatch, and settlement functions between power 
marketers and independent system operators or regional transmission organizations. The product 
known as nMarket™ is developed for markets such as California, ERCOT, New England, New York, 
Ontario, and PJM that has the ability to bid, offer, and schedule for ancillary service products, provide 
validation and dispute management for ISO/RTO settlements, and to perform shadow settlements, 
generating an internal settlement summary that can be compared to the ISO settlement statement. For 
example, nMarket™ Midwest has 4 key modules to handle all its features: TradeManager, 
OperationManager, SettlementManager, and InformationManager. The Structure Group offers 
consulting services in 5 different services lines: business process, enterprise integration, human 
performance, market readiness, and software implementation. In the market readiness lines, the 
Structure Group helps to provides companies and operators in the following areas: business and 
information technology program and project management, solution selection, market trial and cutover 
support, protocol development, market surveillance/monitoring/analysis, and dispute management 
and contract management. 
US Government Printing Office (GPO) 
Homepage: http://bookstore.gpo.gov; Category: Pay-For 
The US GPO offers products on vast variety of topics. Publications available for purchase in the 
energy industry are: 
• Annual Energy Outlook with projections to 2020 
• Annual Energy Review 1997-2000 
• Clean Energy for the 21st Century 
• Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry 
• Coal Industry Annual 
• Code of Federal Regulations 
• Electric Power Annual/Monthly 
• Electric Sales and Revenue 
• Energy Act 2000 
• Financial Statistics of Major United States Investor-Owned Electric Utilities, 1996 
• And more 
